display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
| 12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Real (as opposed to logical) abstract terms, or at least those which are conceived as real, are either essences or parts of essences, or else accidents (i.e. beings added to a substance). | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.08) | |
| A reaction: Interesting to refer to accidents as 'beings'. This seems to fit abstraction by ignoring, since you can either ignore the accidents to get the essence, or ignore the essence to get the accidents. |
| 12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Things which are uniform, containing no variety, are always mere abstractions: for instance, time, space, and the other entities of pure mathematics. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
| A reaction: I presume that being 'mere abstractions' denies them ontological status, and makes them creations of thought. If so, I like this idea a lot. |
| 12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible for us to know individuals or to find any way of precisely determining the individuality of any thing except by keeping hold of the thing itself. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
| A reaction: 'The tallest woman in London' seems to determine someone perfectly well, though only by cross-referencing universal concepts like 'tall'. |
| 12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: If two individuals were perfectly similar and equal and, in short, indistinguishable in themselves, there would be no principle of individuation. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the main motive for Leibniz's unusual claim that there cannot be two indiscernible individuals, but it looks suspiciously like an a priori claim made about what should be an a posteriori discovery. Are electrons distinguishable? |
| 13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It is by means of things that we must distinguish one time and place from another, rather than vice versa. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
| A reaction: This rests on Leibniz's relative view of space (as opposed to Newton's absolute view). If you need to re-identify a thing to individuate it, re-identifying the exact place or time seems impossible, but it is usually manageable with thing. |
| 13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In addition to the difference of time or of place there must always be an internal principle of distinction: although there can be many things of the same kind, it is still the case that none of them are ever exactly alike. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27) | |
| A reaction: This rests on Leibniz's unusual view that all things (even electrons) are qualitatively distinct. Personally I disagree with that, but agree with the idea. Things have time and place because they have identity, not the other way around. |
| 12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Fluidity is the fundamental condition, and the division into bodies is carried out - there being no obstacle to it - according to our need. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.13) | |
| A reaction: Leibniz is referring to what he usually calls 'aggregates', like piles of bricks, which are things lacking a unifying substance. There may be no true substances, in which fluidity is the order of the day. |