16158
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Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
The concrete, particular object actually is a composite not just of matter and form, but also a large number of accidents, like size, weight, colour. So we should not assume that the composite of matter and form is identified with the concrete particular.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.74
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A reaction:
That gives a nice well-rounded picture of how we should understand a physical object, to fit it into the rest of our conceptual scheme, and the way we think about it.
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18269
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Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege]
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Full Idea:
How are we to conceive of logical objects? My only answer is, we conceive of them as extensions of concepts or, more generally, as ranges of values of functions ...what other way is there?
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From:
Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.07.28), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 epigr
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A reaction:
This is the clearest statement I have found of what Frege means by an 'object'. But an extension is a collection of things, so an object is a group treated as a unity, which is generally how we understand a 'set'. Hence Quine's ontology.
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12062
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Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
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Full Idea:
Later in 'Metaphysics' Aristotle sees form as offering better prospects of separability and being a this, and treats separability and being a 'this' as better indicators of substancehood than not being a predicable.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.5
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A reaction:
'Form' will be the word 'eidos', which is also Plato's word for his 'Forms'. I'm thinking that form will bestow individual identity, as in the snubness of a particular nose, where merely being 'a nose' only gives general identity.
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16156
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Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Even things in the same species have different causes, differing not, evidently, by species but in as much as particular things have different causes. For instance, your matter, form and motive cause are all different from mine.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1071a27)
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A reaction:
Yes! This is the answer to my problem of the docile tiger, which has its own character, as well as the generic form of a tiger. Aristotle is firmly committed to the priority of individual over species.
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