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Ideas for 'works', 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'' and 'lectures'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9202 Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: We normally think of logical form as exclusively an attribute of sentences; however, the notion may also be taken to have application to objects.
     From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p. 3)
     A reaction: A striking proposal which seems intuitively right. If one said that objects have 'powers', one might subsume abstract and physical objects under a single account.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
13276 The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6
     A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
13277 The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5
     A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
9206 We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The failure to distinguish between the identity or essence of an object and its necessary features is an instance of what we may call 'modal mania'.
     From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p. 9)
     A reaction: He blames Kripke's work for modal mania, a reaction to Quine's 'contempt' for modal notions. I don't actually understand Fine's remark (yet), but it strikes me as incredibly important! Explanations by email, please.