display all the ideas for this combination of texts
125 ideas
16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The concrete, particular object actually is a composite not just of matter and form, but also a large number of accidents, like size, weight, colour. So we should not assume that the composite of matter and form is identified with the concrete particular. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.74 | |
A reaction: That gives a nice well-rounded picture of how we should understand a physical object, to fit it into the rest of our conceptual scheme, and the way we think about it. |
16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With things that do not have matter, they are all unities of a kind simpliciter. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b24) | |
A reaction: Are all abstract objects unities? Are all sets Aristotelian unities? Only the brackets unify a disparate bunch of things. Are the primes one object or many? If many, each one needs an intrinsic unity to pick it out. The group of primes lacks matter. |
10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers treat that is which not by making the logical point that that which is not is - not without qualification, but just that it is a thing which is not. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a22) | |
A reaction: He is mainly refer to the mature works of Plato, especially 'Parmenides', in which he seems to have been mesmerised by that problem of referring to what doesn't exist. Key question: is there more than one way to 'exist'? |
11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each man has knowledge when we think that he knows the primary cause or explanation ('proté aitia'). | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0983a25) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the best starting point for individuation. Finding the 'origin' is not quite the same as finding the cause, and finding the 'role' or 'function' is parasitic on the underlying explanation or cause. |
12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Later in 'Metaphysics' Aristotle sees form as offering better prospects of separability and being a this, and treats separability and being a 'this' as better indicators of substancehood than not being a predicable. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.5 | |
A reaction: 'Form' will be the word 'eidos', which is also Plato's word for his 'Forms'. I'm thinking that form will bestow individual identity, as in the snubness of a particular nose, where merely being 'a nose' only gives general identity. |
16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It just is not the case that individuals are the individuals they are by virtue of some intrinsic essential distinguishing mark. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.78 | |
A reaction: That invites the question what does distinguish qualitatively identical things from one another. I'm not sure if Aristotle even bothers about that question. |
16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Even things in the same species have different causes, differing not, evidently, by species but in as much as particular things have different causes. For instance, your matter, form and motive cause are all different from mine. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1071a27) | |
A reaction: Yes! This is the answer to my problem of the docile tiger, which has its own character, as well as the generic form of a tiger. Aristotle is firmly committed to the priority of individual over species. |
590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are numerically one in matter, formally one in their account, generically one in their pattern of predication [genos], and one by analogy if related to a further one. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1016b30) | |
A reaction: Very subtle distinctions. What I like is that the notion of numerical unity is comprehensively tied to the notion of individual identity. 'To be is to be countable' may be wrong, but it is better than Quine's 'to be is to be the value of a variable' |
603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What makes man a unity, and not a plurality of, say, animal and biped? Especially if, as some claim, Animal Itself and Biped Itself exist. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045a13) |
10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Our conclusion is as follows: with things that are primary and spoken of per se, the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing and the thing itself are one and the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032a05) | |
A reaction: It is tantalizing to know whether or not Aristotle has really said anything here. It might be clearer if we said 'a thing is its essence', but that may not be quite what he is saying. [P.S. V.Politis translates as 'essence'!] |
17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Among things naturally simple those [may] have unity and priority fully whose processes are relatively indivisible and simple. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a20) | |
A reaction: This is the first of four theories of unity which he offers for discussion. If the process bestows unity, you then have to judge the process as unified. If the indivisibility bestows unity, then things other than processes can be indivisible. |
17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A thing may be formally indivisible, something cognitively and scientifically indivisible. Hence what cause substances to be single things should be thought of as the primary unity. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a31) | |
A reaction: This is his fourth and final proposal for unity, and it is obviously his preferred theory, because it is the hylomorphic view, that the form or nature of the thing bestows the unity. It is sort of right, but a rather thin theory as it stands. |
17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: [A thing may be unified because it is] the numerically indivisible, the particular. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a30) | |
A reaction: One of four possible theories of unity. This one seems to beg the question, or only to offer unity as a primitive, unanalysable concept. Only abstract objects strike us as utterly indivisible. |
16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Z it seems that it is the form that provides the object with its identity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics | |
A reaction: See Aristotle on 'Hylomorphism' for what this means. By form he means a combination of structure, dispositions and controlling principles. |
17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some things are one by contact, some by mixture, and some by position. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1082a16) | |
A reaction: So if several things are stuck together, or mixed together, or in the same location, that can unify them? They sound rather weak modes of unification. |
13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In general those things that do not admit of division [diairesis] are one insofar as they do not admit of it. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1016b03) | |
A reaction: Aristotle gives a man, an animal and a magnitude as examples. The interesting thing here is that being 'one' seems to come in degrees, where most metaphysicians long for oneness to be an absolute. |
17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The reason why all things are unities is indivisibility. In some, it is indivisibility with regard to movement, in others with regard to thought and the account. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a35) | |
A reaction: This is puzzling, since Aristotle wasn't an atomist, and therefore thought that everything was endlessly divisible. He might better have said that unified things 'strongly resist division'. |
17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Other things get to be unities by dint of the fact that the account [logos] of them is single, ...a thought about which is a single thought, ...which is an indivisible thought, ..which is a thought about a formally or numerically indivisible object. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a28) | |
A reaction: This highlights the distinction between things that seem intrinsically unified, and things on which we bestow unity. But note that towards the end of the quotation Aristotle elides the two together. |
12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian substance is prior in three ways: it is prior to nonsubstance in being separate, it is prior in definition, and it is prior in knowledge. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 2.4 | |
A reaction: 'Being separate' means it doesn't dependent on anything else, so it is prior because it is fundamental, in relations of ontological dependence. |
11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance', or 'proté ousia' as 'primary substance'. 'Substance' is a particular answer to the question 'What is proté ousia?' The Latin 'substantia' means 'that which lies under', translating 'to hupokeimenon'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], subst) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be rather important in the exegesis of Aristotle's metaphysics, but Politis seems to hold a minority view, even though what he says here is very persuasive. |
11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: We choose to translate 'proté ousia' (often simply 'ousia') as 'primary being' and not as 'primary substance'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.3 | |
A reaction: His point, explained later, is that the idea that 'ousia' is substance is a theory being proposed by Aristotle, not the meaning of the word. |
569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If, in the case of things that are, the primary object is substance, then we can state the fundamental duty of the philosopher: it is to gain possession of the principles and causes of substances. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003b19) |
615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The enquiries of the pre-Socratic philosophers were really into the principles, elements and causes of substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1069a20) |
592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Philosophers have endlessly discussed and been baffled by the question 'What is that which is?' Now this question just is the question 'What is substance (ousia)?' | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028b04) | |
A reaction: Vasilis Politis says 'ousia' is 'primary being'. 'Substance' is a theory about the nature of primary being. |
599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It may well be necessary that certain unobserved substances exist as it is, even if we cannot know which they are. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a02) |
16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's mature ontology takes biological organisms as its paradigm substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.1 | |
A reaction: 'Mature' is here to eliminate 'Categories' where, I take it, any coherent object counts as a substance, with the categories giving the essence. Organism are more clearly categorised, but that's all. Van Inwagen makes this idea a key one. |
16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: In Categories a primary substance has ontological priority, where other things depend on its existence, ..but in Metaphysics he emphasizes conceptual priority, where the primary is what is understood through itself (a definable unity). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro | |
A reaction: Interesting for my view of essence as rooted in explanation. It is the Metaphysics version that appeals to me. A metaphysics is constructed from our modes of understanding. 'Concavity' is his example of a primary unity. |
600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Fire, earth, water and air, and other simple bodies are agreed to be substances, as are plants, plant parts, animals, animal parts, and the heavens and their parts. Forms and mathematicals are more controversial. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1042a07) |
595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: On this account as it stands, it is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a10) |
11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are said to be substance [ousia] because, far from being predicated of some subject, other things are predicated of them; in another way, for an intrinsic thing, it is the cause of being for it, as the soul is for the animal | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a13-23) | |
A reaction: This passage is used by M. Woods and others to argue that Aristotle has two different meanings for 'ousia' [substance, being]. Vasilis Politis argues against this view (pp.228). Aristotle is probably making two observations about a single thing. |
12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The essence (to ti en einai), whose account (logos) is a definition, is also said to be the substance (ousia) of the particular. So there are two accounts of 'ousia' - as ultimate subject (hupokeimenon), never predicated of others, or as a this (tode ti). | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a22-) | |
A reaction: This slightly muddling assertion seems to be a report of how people use 'ousia', rather than Aristotle's theory. Attempts to translate this idea into English make fascinating reading! Hang on to the Greek, or you'll never get the hang of it! |
10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substance of a particular thing is variously held to be that which it was to be that thing, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject, which is that of which other entities are said, but is never itself being said-of anything else. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028b30) | |
A reaction: This formulation sounds worryingly verbal to me, but I don't suppose Aristotle meant it entirely that way. |
11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It may seem that matter is substance, but this cannot be so, because what we think to be the central features of substance are separability and thisness. Then it seems more plausible to say that the form and the composite are substance than matter is. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a27) | |
A reaction: This is an important basic point, because modern materialism takes matter (of some sort) to be basic, but Aristotle seems to take identity (and form and essence) to be basic, and matter to be merely at their service. |
10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substance is the form dwelling in the object, and from it the substance that is a composite of the form and of matter is said to be a substance. So concavity is a substance, the composite of which and of nose are snub nose and snubness. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a29) | |
A reaction: So there is simple substance [ousia?] and composite substance. Notice the startling example that concavity is a substance. Think hard about that. Substance, but not as we know it, Jim. |
12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's argument is that if we understand the substance of a thing to be that which unifies it, and if we understand that a universal is predicated of many things, then we will see that a universal cannot be the substance of a thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b1-15) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle | |
A reaction: Presumably if universals are predicated of something, or something 'partakes' of the universal, then we want to know about the 'something', not about the universal. But do we end up with substances being 'bare particulars'? |
12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substance of each thing ...is the primary cause of being for it. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b27) | |
A reaction: Wedin says that here Aristotle announces this 'with finality'. This is 'for each thing', and hence is essence at the level of the individual, not of the kind. Identifying the 'cause of being' of a thing is taken to be its best possible explanation. |
607 | None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: None of the universals can be a substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1053b13) |
11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The claim that 'proté ousia' is substance is a particular answer to 'What is proté ousia?', so 'substance' is not what it means. The Latin 'substantia' translates Aristotle's 'to hupokeimenon' ('that which lies under'). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.3 | |
A reaction: It seems that in 'Categories' Aristotle identified 'primary being' with 'that which lies under', but the notion of 'essence' comes into the picture in 'Metaphysics'. Big problems of textual exegesis. |
12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle holds that substances are distinct from other beings by virtue of their high degree of unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4 | |
A reaction: It seems to me that the notion of 'substance' (translating 'ousia' thus) can't mean anything more than 'being with identity'. Then 'essence' is offered as that which bestows the identity on the being. |
16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The last [primary] matter and the shape-form [morphe] are the same and a unity, the one in potentiality and the other in actuality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b19) | |
A reaction: This seems to be exactly the statue/clay problem, that they have different modal properties, although coinciding in actuality. |
10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney'. ...The building is said to be 'bricked', not 'bricks'. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1033a08) | |
A reaction: We have the same distinction in English (best expressed as 'made of stone'). The point is that in thought we identify a statue as primarily something other than the stone of which it is made, though that may not prove anything about reality. |
16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: The form of a statue depends upon bronze (or some similar stuff) for its existence, while the bronze has no comparable need for the form of the statue. The bronze can exist before acquiring the form, and continue after the form has been removed. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Some would cite this as precisely the modal difference between them that seems to suggest they are two objects. I would say that their different status shows that they shouldn't be thought of as two 'objects'. An object with two natures? |
11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that changing things, even if they are somehow real, do not have an essence; but Aristotle argues that changing things have a changeless essence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 |
12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy, in the guise of form, has an explanatory rather than an ontological role. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance Intro | |
A reaction: I take this to be the correct way to understand Aristotle, and the correct way to understand the concept of essence. We don't observe essences, but the concept of essence is forced upon us when we seek the best explanation of things. |
16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Though he retains objects from the 'Categories', in 'Metaphysics' these yield their status as primary substances to their substantial forms. Concrete particulars are now secondary, and that which underlies everything is the substantial form. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: Frede says he moved from realism about substances to nominalism. Presumably substances within objects are real concreta, but forms are abstract, leaving the the object as a purely material thing. |
11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: By form [eidos] I mean the essence [to ti en einai] of each thing and its primary being [prote ousia]. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032b01) | |
A reaction: [Tr. Vasilis Politis. Lawson-Tancred has 'what-it-was-to-be-that-thing' instead of 'essence', and 'substance' instead of 'being']. This may be the single most important sentence in 'Metaphysics' for understanding his theory of being. Cf. 'formal cause'. |
12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Form is not an accidental property of matter, and it is not a necessary property of matter. These considerations make it unlikely that Aristotle holds form or essence to be a property of matter in the composite substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.5 | |
A reaction: I suppose form bestows the identity, and the identity gives rise to the properties. But you don't create identity on Monday, and add the properties on Tuesday, so forming an entity and giving it properties seem to coincide. |
16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian universe is a world of tension and commotion - ordered and preserved by form, disordered by matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.7 | |
A reaction: This connects Aristotle quite strongly with presocratic predecessors like Heraclitus and Empedocles. But then it fits perfectly with modern discussions of entropy, and the forces that hold entropy back. |
16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's earlier 'Categories' theory of substance, and his later 'Metaphysics' theory, are radically different. The first is realistic, and the second nominalistic. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: Frede claims that 'Categories' is clearly earlier. It is certainly profoundly different from 'Metaphysics'. |
16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle's theory a substantial form can count as a proper subject, since the generic matter of which the form is predicated is in fact a property of the form rather than the form's being a property of it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand the idea of matter being the 'property' of a form, but 'matter' [hule] seems to be a particular way of thinking about stuff when it participates in an object, rather than just the amorphous stuff. Just 'predicated of'? |
12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian essentialism is not correctly portrayed as the view that an essential property is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs at all. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation VII | |
A reaction: The view I am arriving at is that essences are rather fluid things, which change their balance and constitution continually. Old people differ essentially from their younger selves. Chemical natural kinds have stable essences, but that is contingent. |
16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The forms of sensible substances are not pure actualities; they in part are constituted by unrealized possibilities and in that sense are not fully real. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics p.90 | |
A reaction: Frede suggests that the form of the Unmoved Mover is the ideal case, because it is fully actual. I like the present idea, because it includes modal truths (i.e. dispositions and powers) in the form which gives a thing its nature. |
12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: An essence is not a property (or a cluster of properties) of the substance whose essence it is, ...because no property (no Aristotelian property) can be the cause of being of an actual individual substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: This is the third of Witt's three unorthodox theses, mainly in defence of individual essences in Aristotle. The first two seem to me to be correct, and the third one is interesting. I'm inclined to think that essences are powers, found below properties. |
16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's theory also includes a special group of forms that can exist without matter, of which the Prime Mover is an instance, and these forms are separate not only in account but also in existence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch 1 | |
A reaction: I am curious about her other examples. This must be the closest that Aristotle gets to his teacher's view of the Forms. |
15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Only those objects are substances which are being constituted under, and by, some nature, ..so that this nature, which is a principle rather than an element, is their substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b31) | |
A reaction: My view is that Aristotle never got to the point of articulating his hylomorphism, so this is just him fishing around, and pointing to where others should investigate. What sort of 'principle'? |
16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The problem of unity disappears if our account is adopted. We allow a matter component and a shape/form component, one existing potentially the other in actuality. …The account is of a unity because one component is material, the other shape/form. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045a24) | |
A reaction: It sounds as though the solution is that matter is material and form is abstract, so there is no rivalry. Elsewhere form seems more like a mechanism or a set of powers. |
16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: The solution to the problem of unity will finally depend upon Aristotle's doctrine of form as an active cause, or, as he refers to form within his broader theory of potentiality and actuality, an active potentiality [dunamis] or nature [phusis]. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro | |
A reaction: Her intermediate proposal to the solution of the problem in Idea 16083 is that matter only survives through change potentially and not actually. |
12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Everything has a sort of matter [hule], provided only that it is not a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [ti en einai] and a per se Form Itself [eidos auto kath' auto] but a possessor of thisness [tode ti]. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a01) | |
A reaction: Kit Fine quotes this to support the claim that Aristotelian 'matter' is not confined to physical objects. Aristotle's essence is the form which imposes identity on the matter. |
16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Aristotle implies that matter is parasitic on the being of what it potentially is. …Hence if something is treated as bronze it is regarded as a composite and not as matter; only if it is treated as potentially a statue is it regarded as matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Note the distinction we should make of bronze as indeterminate 'stuff', and a lump of specific bronze, which might be a precondition for casting a statue. On Gill's reading, Greek 'matter' is much more specific than the modern word. |
12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter is comprehensive in its scope. It applies, not merely to physical, but also to non-physical objects; for they may have non-physical objects as their matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Kit Fine - Aristotle on Matter §1 | |
A reaction: My plea about bizarre ontological claims is always 'If you claim it exists, tell me what it is made of!' This Aristotle chap now offers them an instant answer to which I have no reply. They are made of 'matter', but not as we know it, Jim. |
12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's notion of matter, unlike ours, is of something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 3.1 | |
A reaction: This conforms with my idea of matter, as something active, containing powers, not some inert stuff waiting for the hand of God to bring it into life. |
12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's characterization of matter as potentiality and of form as actuality means that the form or essence determines what the matter is. So matter does not have any independent contribution to make to the definition and essence of the substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2 | |
A reaction: We might say that of the wood which constitutes a lectern, but in the case of a magnet it seems that we are directly encountering the powers of the matter. ...though you might say that iron is the matter and magnetisation the form? |
597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Is there a house over and above its bricks? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1033b19) |
10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
Full Idea: A subject which has no properties of its own at all is called by Aristotle 'ultimate matter', and it is hotly disputed whether Aristotle acknowledges that such matter exists. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.174 |
16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are two ways of being a substrate [to hupokeimenon], either as possessor of thisness (as the animal is a substrate for its properties) or as matter is a substrate for the actuality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b05) | |
A reaction: A bit confusing, since the possessor of thisness will obviously have what we call 'identity', whereas matter cannot have identity on its own (because it also needs form). |
16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: To avoid the outcome (possible in 'Categories') that the subject might be nothing at all, Aristotle insists that a legitimate subject must be separate and a 'this' [tode ti]. Forms and composites satisfy the revised criterion in different ways. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I take it that we would say that a 'this' is an entity which possesses 'identity', and is perhaps countable. For Aristotle being a 'this' seems to require a possibility of definition. This is a powerful Aristotelian thought, needed in modern metaphysics. |
16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that anything should be produced if there were nothing existing before. Obviously then some part of the result will pre-exist of necessity. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032b30) | |
A reaction: This is arguing for a substrate on the basis of the ex nihilo principle. Creation needs raw materials as a basis. This may be the obscure 'prime matter'. |
10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you extract all other features of the object, what is revealed as being left over? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a10) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the key question in matters of identity, which leads us to talk of substrata, or essences, or substance, none of which seem graspable. |
13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The contents of the formula which explains a thing are parts of the whole. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1023a24) | |
A reaction: This is part of a catalogue of ways in which things can be parts [1023b08-25]. I like this, because it fits my general thesis, that the desire for explanation is the driving force behind our metaphysics. |
15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the case of a quantity that has a beginning, a middle and an end, there are those instances in which the order does not create a differentia, which are said to be 'sums', and those is which it does, which are said to be 'wholes'. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1024a01-5) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Aristotle is so much better than the run-of-the-mill naďve modern metaphysician. |
15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The syllable is something - not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else; ...that something must itself be either an element or composed of elements. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b16-19) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints the key initial question, not just about the claims of 'holism', but about the whole puzzle of what give objects their identity? |
16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The syllable is something in its own right, not just a heap of vowel and consonant but something different. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b16) | |
A reaction: This is the classic Greek example of a whole, and a slogan for claims that wholes are not merely collections of parts. |
12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Aristotle gives certain samples of 'hanging together', notably continuity, rigidity, uniformity, qualitative similarity, being of a like kind, being of like matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b05-) by Peter Simons - Parts 8.1 | |
A reaction: Families are scattered, lakes aren't rigid, cakes aren't uniform, complex gadgets have dissimilar parts, two kinds can be united, and only boring things are made of one sort of matter. Nice try, though. Simons rightly adds causation. |
11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Aristotle calls a substance a nature. This expresses essence as what underlies a thing's characteristic behaviour, whereas whatness expresses it as underlying the definition, and essence refers to it as that through which and in which it has existence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.92 | |
A reaction: I don't really understand the third one, unless it is what gives something its identity, which probably then reduces to the second one. The big choice is between essence explaining behaviour and essence explaining definition. Interesting. |
12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, the essential properties of an object are those which are retained by it during any change through which the object remains identifiable; and they are the properties which are most important in our scientific knowledge of it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Irving M. Copi - Essence and Accident p.712 | |
A reaction: This pioneering thought of Copi's (at least, he was a pioneer in that he read Aristotle properly) strikes me as the key to understanding the concept of essence. |
11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle wanted to argue (against Plato) that changing, material things, and not only universals that are true of them, have an essence. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: This is the huge idea which Aristotle contributes to our understanding of the world, and which I take to be one of the most important ideas in philosophy (though I accept that defending essences is a little precarious). |
11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Some critics say that Aristotle conceives of essences as universals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: [He cites M.Woods for this view] Politis opposes this view of Aristotle, and I think I do (with limited scholarship!). It seems to be an unorthodox view when discussing Aristotelian essences, but a very common view when discussing properties. |
12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: The primary role of essences in Aristotle's theory of substance is causal, rather than classificatory. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.4 | |
A reaction: This is the nicest summary of the view which I wish to champion. Classification results from patterns of causation, just as laws of nature result from regularities in the behaviour of causal powers. |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Essence has been conceived either on the model of definition, involving the 'real' as opposed to 'nominal' definitions, or it is elucidated in modal terms, located in de re cases of modal attributions (an object being necessarily a certain way). | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Fine sets out to defend the definitional view, which derives from Aristotle, his line being that necessity depends on essence, and so cannot be used to define it. I think I agree. |
12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Particular perceptible substances are excluded from definition. ...An object that admits of being in a variety of states is an object of opinion, and thus incontrovertibly not of definition. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1039b30) | |
A reaction: This more or less demolishes my original reading of Aristotle, so back to the drawing board. We need to revise Aristotle. He says differentiae home in the individual but never get there. I (now) say cross-referencing of universals gets you there. |
12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle describes form or essence as the cause of there being an actual individual substance, and as the cause of its being a unity rather than a heap. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: Wiggins defends the species-essence view (Idea 12068) by preferring the 'secondary substance' account in 'Categories' to Aristotle's ideas about 'form' which emerge later in 'Metaphysics'. I prefer Witt to Wiggins. |
12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle the essences of individual substances are individual rather than universal, ...since nothing universal can be a substance, nor can it be a principle or cause of a substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: This is the second of Witt's three theses which she offers in opposition to the orthodox interpretation of Aristotle, and again I think she is right. |
17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai] for a single thing is what-it-was-to-be-that-thing for a particular. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054a16) | |
A reaction: This seems to give clear support for the view I favour, that Aristotle believes in individual essences, and not just generic kinds. |
12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: We should replace the traditional interpretation of Aristotelian essences - as clusters of universal properties - with an interpretation according to which an essence is an individual substance, though not a composite or sensible substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5 | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this is a growing view amongst Aristotle scholars, which really ruins a widespread view which I associate with Wiggins, that essences are to do with categories, sortals and kinds. I associate essences with explanations. |
11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: Aristotle does not label 'essential' what are now called 'individual essences'. The properties which belong essentially to an individual are always general properties, capable of belonging to more than one thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: [She offers four references from 'Metaphysics' in support] I think I want to disagree with Aristotle on this one (gulp). Thus his essential properties are one-over-many - his version of universals. I say individuals explain universals, and are prior. |
12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's notion of form or essence is meant to explain why there is an individual substance there at all, not what features constitute the identity of a given individual substance within a domain of individual substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.4 | |
A reaction: I begin to think that the notion of 'essence' is extremely useful in aiding our grasp of reality, but the notion of 'substance' is not. We can just talk of 'identity', without implying some stuff that constitutes that identity. Essence is powers. |
11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: It seems that Aristotle thinks that the essence and the form is a particular, ...though a very different interpretation argues that, for Aristotle, the essence and form of a changing, material thing is a universal, namely the species of the thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: I am fairly thoroughly persuaded that Politis's view (the first half of this idea) is the correct interpretation, and it is certainly the one I find more congenial. The second one I associate with the erroneous idea of sortal essentialism, as in Wiggins. |
16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Aristotle shows that, for something to be a subject at all, it must be specifiable as something in itself, with essential properties that are mentioned in its defining account, since no subject can be the bearer of accidental properties alone. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle supporting the very modern necessary-properties view of essentialism. Notice that it emerges from being 'specifiable' - that is, from Aristotle's requirement that a logos and definition be available. He rejects bare particulars. |
12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: If definition is of the universal rather than of the particular, ...it begins to appear that individual material substances do not have definitions and, hence, do not have essences at all. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.1 | |
A reaction: This is a very challenging claim against my own defence (and Witt's) of individual essences. In switching to individual essences, one has to make them unstable and variable, and lacking necessity, and hence maybe not essential. |
10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
Full Idea: Aristotle believes that the essence of a thing is those per se features of it that are mentioned in a definition. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a02) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.177 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 11291. |
11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, the essence of a thing is what is stated in the definition of that thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], defs) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 |
11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A what-it-was to-be-that-thing only belongs to those things for whom an account just is a definition. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a06) | |
A reaction: That seems to be that 'to ti en einai' (aka essence) only has a 'logos' if it has a 'horismos'. It seems that having a definition as its account is a necessary condition for an essence, but not sufficient. It looks to me as if essence must be explanatory. |
11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian view is that essential properties sort entities in some fashion. ...Being an entity, or being self-identical, or being a unity, fail to sort Socrates from anything else, but being identical with Socrates sorted him from everything. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Ruth Barcan Marcus - Essential Attribution p.196 | |
A reaction: [She cites Daniel Bennett 1969 for this] This doesn't feel right. I take it that sorting things is posterior to discovering that they have different causal powers, as with H2O and XYZ, or jadeite and nephrite. |
11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai, essence] is, for each thing, what it is taken to be [kath' hauto, in virtue of itself] per se. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029b13) | |
A reaction: [Translations is brackets from Vasilis Politis] Aristotle's other definition of essence is in terms of definition - Idea 10963 and Idea 11292. |
12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai] is a unity of a kind straight off, just as it is a being of a kind. And that is why none of these things has some other cause of their being a unity, any more than they do of their being a being of a kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b04) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the key importance of the notion of essence - it is what both bestows unity on things in the world (which is basic to ontology and epistemology), and what enables us to categorise things (basic to epistemology). |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We have an informal way of saying an object essentially has a property, as 'the object must have the property if it is to be the object that it is', and this form of words manages to convey what we wish to convey. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 4) | |
A reaction: The importance of this claim is that it makes no mention of 'necessity'. Fine's view is plausible, but hard to evaluate once he has said. We seem to then divide an object's properties into identity properties, causal properties and peripheral properties. |
10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, having an essence is the criterion of being a substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178 |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The simplest form of the modal account takes an object to have a property essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has the property. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 3) | |
A reaction: Fine wants to reverse the account, explaining necessities in terms of prior essences. |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: With the advent of quantified modal logic, philosophers have been in a better position to formulate essentialist claims. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 3) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the role which logic plays in modern analytic philosophy. It is not an unreasonable assumption that we will understand a theoretical problem more clearly if we can articulate it more accurately. |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Far from viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical necessity, we should view metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as one of the most powerful proposals in modern philosophy (even if it is a reiteration of Aristotle!). |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: If an essence is a sum of essential properties (had in all possible worlds where it exists), Fine points out that it seems grossly to overgenerate essential properties ('S is either a man or a mouse', or 'S is such that 2+2=4'). | |
From: report of Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 6 | |
A reaction: To me this is the sort of mess you get into when you accept that 'being such that p' is a property. Defenders of the modal approach always have to eliminate 'trivial' properties from essences, but non-trivial is a defining feature of an essence. |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Can we not recognise a sense of 'what an object is', according to which it lies in the nature of a singleton to have Socrates as a member, even though it does not lie in the nature of Socrates to belong to the singleton? | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5) | |
A reaction: Important and persuasive. It echoes the example in Idea 11162, that the necessary relation is not part of the essence. Socrates is necessarily in {Socrates}, but that is because of the set, not because of Socrates. Essences causes necessities. |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Necessarily any necessary truth will hold if Socrates exists. But it is no part of Socrates' essence that there be infinitely many prime numbers, ..or that objects like the Eiffel Tower have their own necessary essence. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5-6) | |
A reaction: This and the 'singleton Socrates' example (Idea 11165) are the twin prongs of Fine's attack on the modal account of essentialism. I think they constitute one of the best single pages in the whole of recent philosophy. Bravo. |
15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle did not subscribe to the modal conception of essence. The essential truths are not even included among the necessary truths; and the essential features of an object are similarly not included among its necessary features. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - Essence, Necessity and Explanation 13.1 | |
A reaction: I take this point to be hugely important. There is no real role for essences in metaphysics if they are not of the Aristotelian type. The necessities just lead you to trivialities, or to conventions. Aristotelian essences lead you to facts. |
11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle characterises metaphysics in three ways: as the science of the first or ultimate explanation of things; as the science of being qua being; and the science of primary being ('ousia'). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: I am a bit baffled about how anything worthwhile can be said about 'being qua being', but the other two seem worth pursuing, and may boil down to the same thing. |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
Full Idea: Fine's view is that the notion of an essential property of a thing should be bound up with the notion of what it is to be that thing (unlike, for example, Socrates being such that there are infinitely many primes). | |
From: report of Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2 | |
A reaction: I would think that Fine is so obviously right that it was hardly worth saying, but philosophers are a funny lot, and are quite likely to claim that features of prime numbers are part of the essence of a long-dead philosopher. |
16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Is it not impossible, even outrageous, that a this and a substance (even if it can be composed of constituents) should be composed not of substances and the this-thing-here but of a quality? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b25) | |
A reaction: This is to show Aristotle's deep hostility to anyone who thinks an essence is just a set of special properties (and the 'anyone' means just about anyone these days). |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
Full Idea: According to Fine's definitional characterization of essential properties, they are those of an object's properties that are part of the object's 'definition'. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2 | |
A reaction: This demands not just an account of what a definition is, but also the notion that there is only one fixed and correct definition (since the object presumably only has one essence) - but there seems to be something relative about a good definition. |
16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Man and horse and items similarly imposed on the particulars but themselves general are not substances but a kind of composite of the relevant account in the relevant matter, considered universally. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1035b27) | |
A reaction: Notice that these concepts are 'imposed' on particulars. This seems close to Locke's 'nominal' essence. It take this quotation to reinforce the priority of the particular in Aristotle's account. |
16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If 'man' and any other item similarly specified is a substance, then none of the contents of the account of man is a substance of anything. 'Animal', for instance, does not exist over and above particular animals. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b31) | |
A reaction: [I think 'particular animals' refers to species, not individuals, here] I take it as self-evident that this implies that species do not exist, apart from the individuals that constitute them. |
12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: Although what-is-it [ti esti] questions serve the classificatory project in 'Categories', they are no help in the causal enquiries of 'Metaphysics' Z.17. The essence of interest can't be the species or the differentia-cum-genus complex. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a05-b36) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.4 | |
A reaction: Wedin's view is that these are compatible. The implication is that the nature of essence depends entirely on what it is you want to explain. Explain the category, or explain the behaviour? |
12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: The standard interpretation holds that Aristotelian essences are species-essences, which are universal essences shared by all members of the same species. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: Her aim is to refute this standard view, in defence of the view that Aristotle really wanted to pinpoint individual essences. I think Witt is correct. |
16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In the central books of 'Metaphysics' there are no longer any genera or species. In Z.13 he argues that genera and universals can't be substances. Since genera are not qualities either, they disappear completely from the ontology. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.13) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. It is so obvious to me that creatures are classified into genera, so genera can't exist separately, that I am bewildered anyone would believe or imply it. |
16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: More unified is whatever is a whole with a certain shape and form, especially if it is by nature and not by force (e.g. by gluing or nailing or tying up), when, that is, it contains in itself the cause of its being continuous. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a24) | |
A reaction: [see also Phys 192b] This is about the only principle available for saying why the essence of an artefact is lesser than a natural essence. The healing of wounds shows that animals have a greater unity than tables? |
16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: There is a critical line to be drawn between those entities whose active source of maintenance is internal and those whose source is external. This is the chief line that Aristotle draws between organisms and artefacts. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.7 | |
A reaction: Plants need water and sunlight, so I'm not sure that this marks the line quite clearly enough. |
12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle could have claimed that the universal is prior to the individual in the epistemic realm, but the individual is prior in the realm of being. ...Instead, he claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.1 | |
A reaction: This point strikes me as fairly self-evident. We only learn about the universal by induction from the individuals. |
12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Aristotle resolves his aporia about substances and universals by distinguishing between actual knowledge, which is of the individual, and potential knowledge, which is of the universal. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], potent) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle | |
A reaction: [See Witt 145-9 for the aporia] A vital piece in the jigsaw I am assembling. I connect this way of thinking with modern modal thinking, and actual and possible worlds. It obviously results in individual essences taking priority. |
16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: If we analyze an ordinary physical object into matter, form and properties, the only item in the case of animate objects that has to stay the same as long as we can talk about the same thing is, on his account, the form. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], change) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.76 | |
A reaction: I would have thought that might work for inanimate natural things, and for artefacts, to a considerable extent. The Ship of Theseus retains its form. |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If there is nothing in the nature of Socrates which demands that he exists, then presumably there is nothing in the nature of Socrates which demands that his parents exist. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 6) | |
A reaction: This sounds conclusive to me, against any claim that Socrates necessarily had those parents, if the claim is based on the identity or esssence of Socrates. |
11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that the explanation of how a thing is generated does not contribute to the explanation of why the thing is the very thing it is. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: Good for him. The origin of a thing strikes me as an entirely different matter from the intrinsic nature of the thing, and I don't see how the origin of something can be necessary, if it is in any way possible that it originated differently. |
12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt] |
Full Idea: Properties of origin are not essential for Aristotle, because he determines what is essential not by reflecting on the identity of an individual, but by considering how to define the individual. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2 | |
A reaction: [see also Idea 12102] This spells out my intuition, or rather my understanding of the normal usage of the word 'essence'. You can fully know the essence of something (e.g. a person), while having no knowledge of the origin. |
11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If any two items have a single substance [ousia, primary being] and a single what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai, essence], then they are themselves a single thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b14) | |
A reaction: [alternative translations by Vasilis Politis] This isn't quite the identity of indiscernibles, because it allows superficial identity along with deep difference (H2O and XYZ, for example, or jadeite and nephrite). |
17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are alike if they are not just the same simpliciter, exhibiting differences in their substrate substance but being formally the same. Examples are larger and smaller quadrangles and unequal straight lines, which are alike but not the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054b06) |
16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To ask why a thing is identical with itself is not to ask a real question in the absence of a clear grasp of the fact ….or of the object. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a12) | |
A reaction: This seems a very nice response to Lewis's attempt to sweep difficulties of identity aside, when he rests identity on primitive self-identity. |
17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: You are one with yourself both in form and in matter. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054a35) |