11380
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Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
If any two items have a single substance [ousia, primary being] and a single what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai, essence], then they are themselves a single thing.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b14)
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A reaction:
[alternative translations by Vasilis Politis] This isn't quite the identity of indiscernibles, because it allows superficial identity along with deep difference (H2O and XYZ, for example, or jadeite and nephrite).
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4885
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Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
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Full Idea:
The truth of "a=b" doesn't require much of 'a' and 'b' other than that there is a single thing to which they both refer. They needn't be interdefinable, or have supervenient properties. In this sense, identity is a very weak relation.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §1.2)
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A reaction:
Interesting. This is seeing the epistemological aspects of identity. Ontologically, identity must invoke Leibniz's Law, and is the ultimately powerful 'relation'. A given student, and the cause of a crop circle, may APPEAR to be quite different.
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