16147
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In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
Though he retains objects from the 'Categories', in 'Metaphysics' these yield their status as primary substances to their substantial forms. Concrete particulars are now secondary, and that which underlies everything is the substantial form.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
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A reaction:
Frede says he moved from realism about substances to nominalism. Presumably substances within objects are real concreta, but forms are abstract, leaving the the object as a purely material thing.
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12071
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Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
An essence is not a property (or a cluster of properties) of the substance whose essence it is, ...because no property (no Aristotelian property) can be the cause of being of an actual individual substance.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro
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A reaction:
This is the third of Witt's three unorthodox theses, mainly in defence of individual essences in Aristotle. The first two seem to me to be correct, and the third one is interesting. I'm inclined to think that essences are powers, found below properties.
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12084
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Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Form is not an accidental property of matter, and it is not a necessary property of matter. These considerations make it unlikely that Aristotle holds form or essence to be a property of matter in the composite substance.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.5
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A reaction:
I suppose form bestows the identity, and the identity gives rise to the properties. But you don't create identity on Monday, and add the properties on Tuesday, so forming an entity and giving it properties seem to coincide.
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16148
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Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's earlier 'Categories' theory of substance, and his later 'Metaphysics' theory, are radically different. The first is realistic, and the second nominalistic.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
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A reaction:
Frede claims that 'Categories' is clearly earlier. It is certainly profoundly different from 'Metaphysics'.
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16112
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A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
In Aristotle's theory a substantial form can count as a proper subject, since the generic matter of which the form is predicated is in fact a property of the form rather than the form's being a property of it.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5
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A reaction:
I'm not sure if I understand the idea of matter being the 'property' of a form, but 'matter' [hule] seems to be a particular way of thinking about stuff when it participates in an object, rather than just the amorphous stuff. Just 'predicated of'?
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16164
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Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
The forms of sensible substances are not pure actualities; they in part are constituted by unrealized possibilities and in that sense are not fully real.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics p.90
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A reaction:
Frede suggests that the form of the Unmoved Mover is the ideal case, because it is fully actual. I like the present idea, because it includes modal truths (i.e. dispositions and powers) in the form which gives a thing its nature.
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15853
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A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Only those objects are substances which are being constituted under, and by, some nature, ..so that this nature, which is a principle rather than an element, is their substance.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b31)
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A reaction:
My view is that Aristotle never got to the point of articulating his hylomorphism, so this is just him fishing around, and pointing to where others should investigate. What sort of 'principle'?
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16088
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Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
The solution to the problem of unity will finally depend upon Aristotle's doctrine of form as an active cause, or, as he refers to form within his broader theory of potentiality and actuality, an active potentiality [dunamis] or nature [phusis].
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro
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A reaction:
Her intermediate proposal to the solution of the problem in Idea 16083 is that matter only survives through change potentially and not actually.
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16092
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In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle implies that matter is parasitic on the being of what it potentially is. …Hence if something is treated as bronze it is regarded as a composite and not as matter; only if it is treated as potentially a statue is it regarded as matter.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1
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A reaction:
Note the distinction we should make of bronze as indeterminate 'stuff', and a lump of specific bronze, which might be a precondition for casting a statue. On Gill's reading, Greek 'matter' is much more specific than the modern word.
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12300
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Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's conception of matter is comprehensive in its scope. It applies, not merely to physical, but also to non-physical objects; for they may have non-physical objects as their matter.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Kit Fine - Aristotle on Matter §1
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A reaction:
My plea about bizarre ontological claims is always 'If you claim it exists, tell me what it is made of!' This Aristotle chap now offers them an instant answer to which I have no reply. They are made of 'matter', but not as we know it, Jim.
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12077
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Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's notion of matter, unlike ours, is of something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 3.1
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A reaction:
This conforms with my idea of matter, as something active, containing powers, not some inert stuff waiting for the hand of God to bring it into life.
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12103
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Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's characterization of matter as potentiality and of form as actuality means that the form or essence determines what the matter is. So matter does not have any independent contribution to make to the definition and essence of the substance.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2
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A reaction:
We might say that of the wood which constitutes a lectern, but in the case of a magnet it seems that we are directly encountering the powers of the matter. ...though you might say that iron is the matter and magnetisation the form?
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16103
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A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
To avoid the outcome (possible in 'Categories') that the subject might be nothing at all, Aristotle insists that a legitimate subject must be separate and a 'this' [tode ti]. Forms and composites satisfy the revised criterion in different ways.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.3
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A reaction:
I take it that we would say that a 'this' is an entity which possesses 'identity', and is perhaps countable. For Aristotle being a 'this' seems to require a possibility of definition. This is a powerful Aristotelian thought, needed in modern metaphysics.
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12878
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Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle gives certain samples of 'hanging together', notably continuity, rigidity, uniformity, qualitative similarity, being of a like kind, being of like matter.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b05-) by Peter Simons - Parts 8.1
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A reaction:
Families are scattered, lakes aren't rigid, cakes aren't uniform, complex gadgets have dissimilar parts, two kinds can be united, and only boring things are made of one sort of matter. Nice try, though. Simons rightly adds causation.
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