16158
|
Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
Full Idea:
The concrete, particular object actually is a composite not just of matter and form, but also a large number of accidents, like size, weight, colour. So we should not assume that the composite of matter and form is identified with the concrete particular.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.74
|
|
A reaction:
That gives a nice well-rounded picture of how we should understand a physical object, to fit it into the rest of our conceptual scheme, and the way we think about it.
|
12062
|
Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
|
|
Full Idea:
Later in 'Metaphysics' Aristotle sees form as offering better prospects of separability and being a this, and treats separability and being a 'this' as better indicators of substancehood than not being a predicable.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.5
|
|
A reaction:
'Form' will be the word 'eidos', which is also Plato's word for his 'Forms'. I'm thinking that form will bestow individual identity, as in the snubness of a particular nose, where merely being 'a nose' only gives general identity.
|
14508
|
A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
|
|
Full Idea:
A thisness is the property of being identical with a certain particular individual - not the property that we all share, of being identical with some individual, but my property of being identical with me, your property of being identical with you etc.
|
|
From:
Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
These philosophers tell you that a thisness 'is' so-and-so, and don't admit that he (and Plantinga) are putting forward a new theory about haecceities, and one I find implausible. I just don't believe in the property of 'being-identical-to-me'.
|
16156
|
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
Even things in the same species have different causes, differing not, evidently, by species but in as much as particular things have different causes. For instance, your matter, form and motive cause are all different from mine.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1071a27)
|
|
A reaction:
Yes! This is the answer to my problem of the docile tiger, which has its own character, as well as the generic form of a tiger. Aristotle is firmly committed to the priority of individual over species.
|
590
|
Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
Things are numerically one in matter, formally one in their account, generically one in their pattern of predication [genos], and one by analogy if related to a further one.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1016b30)
|
|
A reaction:
Very subtle distinctions. What I like is that the notion of numerical unity is comprehensively tied to the notion of individual identity. 'To be is to be countable' may be wrong, but it is better than Quine's 'to be is to be the value of a variable'
|
17842
|
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
The reason why all things are unities is indivisibility. In some, it is indivisibility with regard to movement, in others with regard to thought and the account.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a35)
|
|
A reaction:
This is puzzling, since Aristotle wasn't an atomist, and therefore thought that everything was endlessly divisible. He might better have said that unified things 'strongly resist division'.
|
17839
|
Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
Other things get to be unities by dint of the fact that the account [logos] of them is single, ...a thought about which is a single thought, ...which is an indivisible thought, ..which is a thought about a formally or numerically indivisible object.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a28)
|
|
A reaction:
This highlights the distinction between things that seem intrinsically unified, and things on which we bestow unity. But note that towards the end of the quotation Aristotle elides the two together.
|
12076
|
Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotelian substance is prior in three ways: it is prior to nonsubstance in being separate, it is prior in definition, and it is prior in knowledge.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 2.4
|
|
A reaction:
'Being separate' means it doesn't dependent on anything else, so it is prior because it is fundamental, in relations of ontological dependence.
|
11284
|
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance', or 'proté ousia' as 'primary substance'. 'Substance' is a particular answer to the question 'What is proté ousia?' The Latin 'substantia' means 'that which lies under', translating 'to hupokeimenon'.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], subst) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.1
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to be rather important in the exegesis of Aristotle's metaphysics, but Politis seems to hold a minority view, even though what he says here is very persuasive.
|
16084
|
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
In Categories a primary substance has ontological priority, where other things depend on its existence, ..but in Metaphysics he emphasizes conceptual priority, where the primary is what is understood through itself (a definable unity).
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro
|
|
A reaction:
Interesting for my view of essence as rooted in explanation. It is the Metaphysics version that appeals to me. A metaphysics is constructed from our modes of understanding. 'Concavity' is his example of a primary unity.
|
11299
|
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
Things are said to be substance [ousia] because, far from being predicated of some subject, other things are predicated of them; in another way, for an intrinsic thing, it is the cause of being for it, as the soul is for the animal
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a13-23)
|
|
A reaction:
This passage is used by M. Woods and others to argue that Aristotle has two different meanings for 'ousia' [substance, being]. Vasilis Politis argues against this view (pp.228). Aristotle is probably making two observations about a single thing.
|
12060
|
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
The essence (to ti en einai), whose account (logos) is a definition, is also said to be the substance (ousia) of the particular. So there are two accounts of 'ousia' - as ultimate subject (hupokeimenon), never predicated of others, or as a this (tode ti).
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a22-)
|
|
A reaction:
This slightly muddling assertion seems to be a report of how people use 'ousia', rather than Aristotle's theory. Attempts to translate this idea into English make fascinating reading! Hang on to the Greek, or you'll never get the hang of it!
|
10941
|
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
The substance of a particular thing is variously held to be that which it was to be that thing, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject, which is that of which other entities are said, but is never itself being said-of anything else.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028b30)
|
|
A reaction:
This formulation sounds worryingly verbal to me, but I don't suppose Aristotle meant it entirely that way.
|
11290
|
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
It may seem that matter is substance, but this cannot be so, because what we think to be the central features of substance are separability and thisness. Then it seems more plausible to say that the form and the composite are substance than matter is.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a27)
|
|
A reaction:
This is an important basic point, because modern materialism takes matter (of some sort) to be basic, but Aristotle seems to take identity (and form and essence) to be basic, and matter to be merely at their service.
|
12093
|
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle's argument is that if we understand the substance of a thing to be that which unifies it, and if we understand that a universal is predicated of many things, then we will see that a universal cannot be the substance of a thing.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b1-15) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle
|
|
A reaction:
Presumably if universals are predicated of something, or something 'partakes' of the universal, then we want to know about the 'something', not about the universal. But do we end up with substances being 'bare particulars'?
|
11233
|
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
Full Idea:
The claim that 'proté ousia' is substance is a particular answer to 'What is proté ousia?', so 'substance' is not what it means. The Latin 'substantia' translates Aristotle's 'to hupokeimenon' ('that which lies under').
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.3
|
|
A reaction:
It seems that in 'Categories' Aristotle identified 'primary being' with 'that which lies under', but the notion of 'essence' comes into the picture in 'Metaphysics'. Big problems of textual exegesis.
|
16096
|
Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
The form of a statue depends upon bronze (or some similar stuff) for its existence, while the bronze has no comparable need for the form of the statue. The bronze can exist before acquiring the form, and continue after the form has been removed.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1
|
|
A reaction:
Some would cite this as precisely the modal difference between them that seems to suggest they are two objects. I would say that their different status shows that they shouldn't be thought of as two 'objects'. An object with two natures?
|
16147
|
In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
Full Idea:
Though he retains objects from the 'Categories', in 'Metaphysics' these yield their status as primary substances to their substantial forms. Concrete particulars are now secondary, and that which underlies everything is the substantial form.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
|
|
A reaction:
Frede says he moved from realism about substances to nominalism. Presumably substances within objects are real concreta, but forms are abstract, leaving the the object as a purely material thing.
|
12071
|
Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
An essence is not a property (or a cluster of properties) of the substance whose essence it is, ...because no property (no Aristotelian property) can be the cause of being of an actual individual substance.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro
|
|
A reaction:
This is the third of Witt's three unorthodox theses, mainly in defence of individual essences in Aristotle. The first two seem to me to be correct, and the third one is interesting. I'm inclined to think that essences are powers, found below properties.
|
12084
|
Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Form is not an accidental property of matter, and it is not a necessary property of matter. These considerations make it unlikely that Aristotle holds form or essence to be a property of matter in the composite substance.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.5
|
|
A reaction:
I suppose form bestows the identity, and the identity gives rise to the properties. But you don't create identity on Monday, and add the properties on Tuesday, so forming an entity and giving it properties seem to coincide.
|
16148
|
Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle's earlier 'Categories' theory of substance, and his later 'Metaphysics' theory, are radically different. The first is realistic, and the second nominalistic.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
|
|
A reaction:
Frede claims that 'Categories' is clearly earlier. It is certainly profoundly different from 'Metaphysics'.
|
16112
|
A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
In Aristotle's theory a substantial form can count as a proper subject, since the generic matter of which the form is predicated is in fact a property of the form rather than the form's being a property of it.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5
|
|
A reaction:
I'm not sure if I understand the idea of matter being the 'property' of a form, but 'matter' [hule] seems to be a particular way of thinking about stuff when it participates in an object, rather than just the amorphous stuff. Just 'predicated of'?
|
16164
|
Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
Full Idea:
The forms of sensible substances are not pure actualities; they in part are constituted by unrealized possibilities and in that sense are not fully real.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics p.90
|
|
A reaction:
Frede suggests that the form of the Unmoved Mover is the ideal case, because it is fully actual. I like the present idea, because it includes modal truths (i.e. dispositions and powers) in the form which gives a thing its nature.
|
15853
|
A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
Only those objects are substances which are being constituted under, and by, some nature, ..so that this nature, which is a principle rather than an element, is their substance.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b31)
|
|
A reaction:
My view is that Aristotle never got to the point of articulating his hylomorphism, so this is just him fishing around, and pointing to where others should investigate. What sort of 'principle'?
|
16088
|
Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
The solution to the problem of unity will finally depend upon Aristotle's doctrine of form as an active cause, or, as he refers to form within his broader theory of potentiality and actuality, an active potentiality [dunamis] or nature [phusis].
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro
|
|
A reaction:
Her intermediate proposal to the solution of the problem in Idea 16083 is that matter only survives through change potentially and not actually.
|
16092
|
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle implies that matter is parasitic on the being of what it potentially is. …Hence if something is treated as bronze it is regarded as a composite and not as matter; only if it is treated as potentially a statue is it regarded as matter.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1
|
|
A reaction:
Note the distinction we should make of bronze as indeterminate 'stuff', and a lump of specific bronze, which might be a precondition for casting a statue. On Gill's reading, Greek 'matter' is much more specific than the modern word.
|
12300
|
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle's conception of matter is comprehensive in its scope. It applies, not merely to physical, but also to non-physical objects; for they may have non-physical objects as their matter.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Kit Fine - Aristotle on Matter §1
|
|
A reaction:
My plea about bizarre ontological claims is always 'If you claim it exists, tell me what it is made of!' This Aristotle chap now offers them an instant answer to which I have no reply. They are made of 'matter', but not as we know it, Jim.
|
12077
|
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle's notion of matter, unlike ours, is of something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 3.1
|
|
A reaction:
This conforms with my idea of matter, as something active, containing powers, not some inert stuff waiting for the hand of God to bring it into life.
|
12103
|
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle's characterization of matter as potentiality and of form as actuality means that the form or essence determines what the matter is. So matter does not have any independent contribution to make to the definition and essence of the substance.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2
|
|
A reaction:
We might say that of the wood which constitutes a lectern, but in the case of a magnet it seems that we are directly encountering the powers of the matter. ...though you might say that iron is the matter and magnetisation the form?
|
16103
|
A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
To avoid the outcome (possible in 'Categories') that the subject might be nothing at all, Aristotle insists that a legitimate subject must be separate and a 'this' [tode ti]. Forms and composites satisfy the revised criterion in different ways.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.3
|
|
A reaction:
I take it that we would say that a 'this' is an entity which possesses 'identity', and is perhaps countable. For Aristotle being a 'this' seems to require a possibility of definition. This is a powerful Aristotelian thought, needed in modern metaphysics.
|
12878
|
Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle gives certain samples of 'hanging together', notably continuity, rigidity, uniformity, qualitative similarity, being of a like kind, being of like matter.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b05-) by Peter Simons - Parts 8.1
|
|
A reaction:
Families are scattered, lakes aren't rigid, cakes aren't uniform, complex gadgets have dissimilar parts, two kinds can be united, and only boring things are made of one sort of matter. Nice try, though. Simons rightly adds causation.
|
11199
|
Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle calls a substance a nature. This expresses essence as what underlies a thing's characteristic behaviour, whereas whatness expresses it as underlying the definition, and essence refers to it as that through which and in which it has existence.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.92
|
|
A reaction:
I don't really understand the third one, unless it is what gives something its identity, which probably then reduces to the second one. The big choice is between essence explaining behaviour and essence explaining definition. Interesting.
|
11294
|
Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle wanted to argue (against Plato) that changing, material things, and not only universals that are true of them, have an essence.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5
|
|
A reaction:
This is the huge idea which Aristotle contributes to our understanding of the world, and which I take to be one of the most important ideas in philosophy (though I accept that defending essences is a little precarious).
|
12070
|
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
For Aristotle the essences of individual substances are individual rather than universal, ...since nothing universal can be a substance, nor can it be a principle or cause of a substance.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro
|
|
A reaction:
This is the second of Witt's three theses which she offers in opposition to the orthodox interpretation of Aristotle, and again I think she is right.
|
12088
|
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
We should replace the traditional interpretation of Aristotelian essences - as clusters of universal properties - with an interpretation according to which an essence is an individual substance, though not a composite or sensible substance.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5
|
|
A reaction:
I get the impression that this is a growing view amongst Aristotle scholars, which really ruins a widespread view which I associate with Wiggins, that essences are to do with categories, sortals and kinds. I associate essences with explanations.
|
12083
|
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle's notion of form or essence is meant to explain why there is an individual substance there at all, not what features constitute the identity of a given individual substance within a domain of individual substances.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.4
|
|
A reaction:
I begin to think that the notion of 'essence' is extremely useful in aiding our grasp of reality, but the notion of 'substance' is not. We can just talk of 'identity', without implying some stuff that constitutes that identity. Essence is powers.
|
11382
|
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
Full Idea:
It seems that Aristotle thinks that the essence and the form is a particular, ...though a very different interpretation argues that, for Aristotle, the essence and form of a changing, material thing is a universal, namely the species of the thing.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5
|
|
A reaction:
I am fairly thoroughly persuaded that Politis's view (the first half of this idea) is the correct interpretation, and it is certainly the one I find more congenial. The second one I associate with the erroneous idea of sortal essentialism, as in Wiggins.
|
16097
|
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aristotle shows that, for something to be a subject at all, it must be specifiable as something in itself, with essential properties that are mentioned in its defining account, since no subject can be the bearer of accidental properties alone.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2
|
|
A reaction:
This is Aristotle supporting the very modern necessary-properties view of essentialism. Notice that it emerges from being 'specifiable' - that is, from Aristotle's requirement that a logos and definition be available. He rejects bare particulars.
|
12091
|
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
Full Idea:
If definition is of the universal rather than of the particular, ...it begins to appear that individual material substances do not have definitions and, hence, do not have essences at all.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.1
|
|
A reaction:
This is a very challenging claim against my own defence (and Witt's) of individual essences. In switching to individual essences, one has to make them unstable and variable, and lacking necessity, and hence maybe not essential.
|
11188
|
The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
|
|
Full Idea:
The Aristotelian view is that essential properties sort entities in some fashion. ...Being an entity, or being self-identical, or being a unity, fail to sort Socrates from anything else, but being identical with Socrates sorted him from everything.
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Ruth Barcan Marcus - Essential Attribution p.196
|
|
A reaction:
[She cites Daniel Bennett 1969 for this] This doesn't feel right. I take it that sorting things is posterior to discovering that they have different causal powers, as with H2O and XYZ, or jadeite and nephrite.
|
11244
|
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
Full Idea:
In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle characterises metaphysics in three ways: as the science of the first or ultimate explanation of things; as the science of being qua being; and the science of primary being ('ousia').
|
|
From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1
|
|
A reaction:
I am a bit baffled about how anything worthwhile can be said about 'being qua being', but the other two seem worth pursuing, and may boil down to the same thing.
|
16144
|
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
If 'man' and any other item similarly specified is a substance, then none of the contents of the account of man is a substance of anything. 'Animal', for instance, does not exist over and above particular animals.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b31)
|
|
A reaction:
[I think 'particular animals' refers to species, not individuals, here] I take it as self-evident that this implies that species do not exist, apart from the individuals that constitute them.
|
12359
|
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
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Full Idea:
Although what-is-it [ti esti] questions serve the classificatory project in 'Categories', they are no help in the causal enquiries of 'Metaphysics' Z.17. The essence of interest can't be the species or the differentia-cum-genus complex.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a05-b36) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.4
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A reaction:
Wedin's view is that these are compatible. The implication is that the nature of essence depends entirely on what it is you want to explain. Explain the category, or explain the behaviour?
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16141
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In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
In the central books of 'Metaphysics' there are no longer any genera or species. In Z.13 he argues that genera and universals can't be substances. Since genera are not qualities either, they disappear completely from the ontology.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.13) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
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A reaction:
Music to my ears. It is so obvious to me that creatures are classified into genera, so genera can't exist separately, that I am bewildered anyone would believe or imply it.
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12090
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Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle resolves his aporia about substances and universals by distinguishing between actual knowledge, which is of the individual, and potential knowledge, which is of the universal.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], potent) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle
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A reaction:
[See Witt 145-9 for the aporia] A vital piece in the jigsaw I am assembling. I connect this way of thinking with modern modal thinking, and actual and possible worlds. It obviously results in individual essences taking priority.
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16159
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For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
If we analyze an ordinary physical object into matter, form and properties, the only item in the case of animate objects that has to stay the same as long as we can talk about the same thing is, on his account, the form.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], change) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.76
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A reaction:
I would have thought that might work for inanimate natural things, and for artefacts, to a considerable extent. The Ship of Theseus retains its form.
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12101
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Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Properties of origin are not essential for Aristotle, because he determines what is essential not by reflecting on the identity of an individual, but by considering how to define the individual.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2
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A reaction:
[see also Idea 12102] This spells out my intuition, or rather my understanding of the normal usage of the word 'essence'. You can fully know the essence of something (e.g. a person), while having no knowledge of the origin.
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11380
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Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
If any two items have a single substance [ousia, primary being] and a single what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai, essence], then they are themselves a single thing.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b14)
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A reaction:
[alternative translations by Vasilis Politis] This isn't quite the identity of indiscernibles, because it allows superficial identity along with deep difference (H2O and XYZ, for example, or jadeite and nephrite).
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12034
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If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
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Full Idea:
There is a temporal argument for the possibility of non-identical indiscernibles, if there could be a cyclical universe, in which each event was preceded and followed by infinitely many other events qualitatively indiscernible from itself.
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From:
Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
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A reaction:
The argument is a parallel to Max Black's indiscernible spheres in space. Adams offers the reply that time might be tightly 'curved', so that the repetition was indeed the same event again.
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14510
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Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
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Full Idea:
Similar to the argument from spatial dispersal, we can argue against the Identity of Indiscernibles from temporal dispersal. It seems there could be a cyclic universe, ..and thus there could be distinct but indiscernible events, separated temporally.
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From:
Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
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A reaction:
See Idea 14509 for spatial dispersal. If cosmologists decided that a cyclical universe was incoherent, would that ruin the argument? Presumably there might even be indistinguishable events in the one universe (in principle!).
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16455
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Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
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Full Idea:
If God creates a globe reached by travelling two diameters in a straight line from another globe, this can be described as two globes in Euclidean space, or a single globe in a tightly curved non-Euclidean space.
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From:
Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
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A reaction:
[my compression of Adams's version of Hacking's response to Black, as spotted by Stalnaker] Hence we save the identity of indiscernibles, by saying we can't be sure that two indiscernibles are not one thing, unusually described.
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