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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A priori/A posteriori' and 'The Possibility of Metaphysics'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change

16059	Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
	Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175
	A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism

8271	An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe]
	Full Idea: The 'endurance' view is that an object persists by being 'wholly present' at more than one time, and the 'perdurance' view is that an object has different temporal parts which exist at different times.
	From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5)
	A reaction: It is tempting to say that only a philosopher would come up with a view as bizarre as the second one. Trying to imagine God's view of time has led to a lot of confusion. Endurance seems to need substance, so bundle views of objects encourage perdurance.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

8272	How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe]
	Full Idea: The temporal parts approach to identity appears to be viciously circular, for how are the 'temporal parts' of tomatoes to be individuated and identified save by reference to the very tomatoes of which they are parts?
	From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.3)
	A reaction: (This attacks the 'perdurance' view - Idea 8271) Something wrong here. Isn't Lowe begging the question, by assuming that a tomato at an instant IS the tomato? To know what a tomato is, you must spend time with it.