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16140
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Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
The concept of substance applies to secondary substances only with some deletions; ..it is not true that they have no subjects, and hence they are not ultimate subjects for all other elements of the ontology.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
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A reaction:
It increasingly strikes that to treat secondary substance (roughly, species) as essence is a shocking misreading of Aristotle. Frede says they are substances, because they do indeed 'underlie'.
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10965
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In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
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Full Idea:
In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle changed his view, as in 'Categories' the substances, the basic realities, were particular items, notably individual men, horses, cabbages etc.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178
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A reaction:
The charge is that having successfully rebelled against Plato, Aristotle gradually succumbed to his teacher's influence, and ended up with a more platonist view. For anti-platonists like myself, the 'Categories' seems to be the key text.
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11036
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A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
A substance, in its most primary sense, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or horse. The species in which things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as are the genera.
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From:
Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02a11)
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A reaction:
This distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' substances is characteristic of Aristotle's earlier metaphysical view, with the later view (more unified and Platonic) in the 'Metaphysics'.
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8287
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Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
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Full Idea:
In 'Categories' primary substances are individual concrete objects, such as a particular horse, whereas in 'Metaphysics' such things are combinations of matter and substantial form, with the latter being the primary substances.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 9.1
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A reaction:
Lowe claims there is no real difference. Aristotle came to think that matter was not part of primary substance, so the shift seems to be that substance was concrete, but then he decided it was abstract. Physicists will prefer 'Metaphysics'.
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16058
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Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
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Full Idea:
If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished.
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From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48
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A reaction:
[SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him.
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