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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Ethical consistency' and 'Letters to Burcher De Volder'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties

19379	The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: That there should be a persistent law of the series, which involves the future states of that which we conceive to be the same, is exactly what I say constitutes it as the same substance.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 4 'Applying'
	A reaction: The 'law of the series' is a bit dubious, but it is reasonable to say that a substance is individuated by its coherent progress of change over time. Disjointed change would imply an absence of substance. The law of the series is called 'primitive force'.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail

16058	Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
	Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48
	A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time

13182	Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Everything accidental or changeable ought to be a modification of something essential or perpetual.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704.06.30)
	A reaction: Clear evidence that Leibniz is very much a traditional Aristotelian essentialist, and not as modal logicians tend to characterise him, as a super-essentialist who thinks all properties are essential. They are necessary for identity, but that's different.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change

16059	Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
	Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175
	A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change?

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

13178	Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Things that differ in place must express their place, that is, they must express the things surrounding, and thus they must be distinguished not only by place, that is, not by an extrinsic denomination alone, as is commonly thought.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20)
	A reaction: This is an unusual view, which has some attractions, as it enables the relations of a thing to individuate it, while maintaining that this is a real difference in character.

19411	In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In nature any straight line you may take is individually different from any other straight line you may find. Accordingly, it cannot come about that two bodies are perfectly equal and alike.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20)
	A reaction: Leibniz was very good at persuasive examples! It remains unclear, though, why he takes the Identity of Indiscernibles to be a necessary truth, when he seems to have only observed it from experience. This is counter to his other principles.

19412	If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: If two bodies differ only in their position, their individual relations to the environment must be taken into account, so that more is involved in their distinguishability than just position.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20)
	A reaction: This seems to allow that two bodies could be intrinsically type-identical (though differing in extrinsic features), which is contrary to his normal view. I suppose a different location in the gravitational field will make an intrinsic difference.