Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Causal Powers' and 'fragments/reports'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier

15262	In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: From the point of view of philosophical logic, the nature of a kind, or a material substance or an individual is its essence, that is, those of its qualities which are inseparable from its being that kind, that material or that individual.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.I)
	A reaction: This might be where the logical and the naturalistic notions of essence come apart. Could something retain its 'natural' essence while losing its identity, or lose its essence while retaining its identity?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

15297	We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: If we know the nature of a particular that explains its properties, powers and capacities and relates them into intelligible clusters, then we can indeed infer from some of the powers and properties to others via its essential nature.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.III)
	A reaction: This is an optimistic assertion of precisely the possibility which Locke denied in Idea 12547. This optimism is the main reason for the revival of scientific essentialism in recent years. It just seems to be true of modern science.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

15266	We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: The essential nature of matter and radiation is energy, so it is maintained, but the point of maintaining this is precisely to allow one to make use of a notion of the nature of things.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.III)
	A reaction: They are defending essentialism, but this seems to be a counterexample, of our need to postulate essences where there are none. It makes our explanations work better, but at the cost of commitment to a 'quasi-substance' (Idea 15265).