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2 ideas
| 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: A 'substance' might be defined to be an object which does not depend for its existence upon any other object (where dependency is defined in terms of necessity. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: I'm inclined to leave out 'substance', which has too much historical baggage, and talk of minimal things having 'identity', and proper things having 'essence'. |
| 16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
| Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48 | |
| A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him. |