Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Essential Attribution' and 'Aristotle on Matter'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: An object must have some of its natural properties in this world. Some of those it has in common with objects of some proximate kind (Aristotelian essentialism), and others individuate it from objects of the same kind (individuating essentialism).
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.193)
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian essentialism may best be understood on a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of the modal operators.
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.189)
     A reaction: I record this because I very much like the sound of it, though I have yet to fully understand it.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
14267 There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
     A reaction: This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach.
14264 Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
     A reaction: This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well.