Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Principia Mathematica' and 'Notes on Comments by Fardella'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3)
     A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif)
     A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Trivially, the Identity of Indiscernibles says that two individuals, Castor and Pollux, cannot have all properties in common. For Castor must have the properties of being identical with Castor and not being identical with Pollux, which Pollux can't share.
     From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], I p.57) by Robert Merrihew Adams - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity 2
     A reaction: I suspect that either the property of being identical with itself is quite vacuous, or it is parasytic on primitive identity, or it is the criterion which is actually used to define identity. Either way, I don't find this claim very illuminating.