Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'Vagueness: a global approach'

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2 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: We simply have no intelligible notion of local indeterminacy or of a borderline case.
     From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 2)
     A reaction: He mentions cases which are near a borderline, and cases which are hard to decide, but denies that these are intrinsically borderline. If there are borderline cases between red and orange, what are the outer boundaries of the border?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
     A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.