display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
| 14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| Full Idea: Wiggins points out that identity is an atemporal relation whereas composition, like parthood, holds only relative to times. | |
| From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.3 | |
| A reaction: If David Cameron is identical to the Prime Minister, that doesn't seem to be atemporal. If x=7 in this problem, I can change x to something else in the next problem. x had better not be equal to 7 and to 9. |
| 11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
| Full Idea: If I repair or destroy an item, I do not repair or destroy each part of it (and since each part of a part is a part this would be difficult). | |
| From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: This seems like a nice refutation of any attempt to claim that a thing is no more than the sum of its parts, but one could analyse the notion of 'destroy', and find it just meant introducing gaps between parts. |