Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Will to Power (notebooks)' and 'Theaetetus'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
20362 We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We borrowed the concept of unity from our 'ego' concept - our oldest article of faith. If we did not hold ourselves to be unified, we would never have formed the concept 'thing'. Now, somewhat late, we are convinced that the ego does not guarantee unity.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §635)
     A reaction: Nietzsche tells a similar story about the emergence and subsequent undermining of truth. I am becoming an enthusiast for Nietzsche's account of how our psychology has generated out metaphysics - which doesn't make the metaphysics false.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
2084 If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
     Full Idea: If a complex or a syllable has no parts and is a single identity, hasn't it turned out to be the same kind of thing as an element or letter?
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205d)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15844 A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
     Full Idea: But this sum now - isn't it just when there is nothing lacking that it is a sum? Yes, necessarily. And won't this very same thing - that from which nothing is lacking - be a whole?
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205a)
     A reaction: This seems to be right, be rather too vague and potentially circular to be of much use. What is the criterion for deciding that nothing is lacking?
15843 The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole does not consist of parts; for it did, it would be all the parts and so would be the sum.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 204e)
     A reaction: That is, 'the whole is the sum of its parts' is a tautology! The claim that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts' gets into similar trouble. See Verity Harte on this.