display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: It does not seem altogether arbitrary to treat the structure of the world (the 'form' of the world) in a different way to the nodes in the structure (the 'matter' of the world). | |
| From: John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: An interesting contemporary spin put on Aristotle's original view. Hawthorne is presenting the Aristotle account as a sort of 'structuralism' about nature. |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: An individual essence is a profile that is necessary and sufficient for some particular thing. | |
| From: John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], Intro) | |
| A reaction: By 'for' he presumably means for the thing to have an existence and a distinct identity. If it retained its identity, but didn't function any more, would that be loss of essence? |
| 19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Equality may be considered as an infinitely small inequality, and we may make inequality approach equality as much as we wish. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature [1687], p.67) | |
| A reaction: An interesting response to David Lewis's brusque dismissal of the problem of identity, as all-or-nothing...end of story. |