display all the ideas for this combination of texts
12 ideas
23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Objects make up the substance of the world. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.021) | |
A reaction: He doesn't say here that the objects are physical, and may be including Frege's abstract objects. His concept of substance seems more like Spinoza than Aristotle. |
8719 | There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Meinong (and Priest) leave room for impossible objects (like a mountain made entirely of gold), and even contradictory objects (such as a round square). This would have a property, of 'being a contradictory object'. | |
From: report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8 | |
A reaction: This view is only possible with a rather lax view of properties. Personally I don't take 'being a pencil' to be a property of a pencil. It might be safer to just say that 'round squares' are possible linguistic subjects of predication. |
8971 | There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong] |
Full Idea: There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects. | |
From: Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]), quoted by Peter van Inwagen - Existence,Ontological Commitment and Fictions p.131 | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen say this idea is 'infamous', but Meinong is undergoing a revival, and commitment to non-existent objects may be the best explanation of some ways of talking. |
8718 | Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Meinong distinguished between 'existing objects' and 'subsisting objects', and being an object does not imply existence, but only 'having properties'. | |
From: report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8 | |
A reaction: Meinong is treated as a joke (thanks to Russell), but this is good. "Father Christmas does not exist, but he has a red coat". He'd better have some sort of existy aspect if he is going to have a property. So he's 'an object'. 'Insubstantial'? |
7756 | Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Meinong insisted (à la Anselm) that any possible object of thought - even a self-contradictory one - has being of a sort even though only a few such things are so lucky as to exist in reality as well. | |
From: report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
A reaction: ['This idea gave Russell fits' says Lycan]. In the English-speaking world this is virtually the only idea for which Meinong is remembered. Russell (Idea 5409) was happy for some things to merely 'subsist' as well as others which could 'exist'. |
15781 | The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong] |
Full Idea: The totality of what exists, including what has existed and what will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of Objects of knowledge. | |
From: Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 01 | |
A reaction: This is rather profound, but the word 'object' doesn't help. I would say 'What we know concerns far more than what merely exists'. |
23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Objects are simple | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.02) | |
A reaction: Presumably all his objects are 'simples', and what we think of as normal objects are counted by LW as 'facts'. |
23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Substance is what remains independently of what is the case. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.024) | |
A reaction: He sees what is the case as comprised of objects, so substance is even more basic. It seems close to Spinoza's single-substance view. |
22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Wittgenstein explicitly said that to know an object I must know all its internal properties. ...Internal properties have form and content; form is 'possibility of occurrence in atomic facts' (2.0141), content is its being that specific object (2.0233). | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.01231) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp' | |
A reaction: [check original quote] This seems to be an essentialist view of (formal) objects. See Potter 347-9 for discussion. The 'external properties' of an object are the atomic facts in which it occurs. |
6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: It is self-evident that identity is not a relation between objects. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5301) | |
A reaction: Part of Wittgenstein's claim that identity statements are 'pseudo-propositions'. See, in reply, the ideas of McGinn on identity. This was part of the drive that led to the extremes of logical positivism, killing metaphysics for two generations. |
22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Russell's definition of identity [x is y if any predicate of x is a predicate of y] won't do, because then one cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5302), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 53 'Ident' | |
A reaction: [The Russell is in Principia] Good. Even if Leibniz is right that no two obejcts have identical properties, it is at least meaningful to consider the possibility. Russell makes it an impossibility, rather than a contingent fact. |
6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5303) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein's attack on identity. It is best (following McGinn) to only speak of resemblance between two things (possibly to a very high degree, as in two electrons). Self-identity just is identity; you can drop the word 'identity', but not the concept. |