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3 ideas
| 10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166) | |
| A reaction: Personally I don't think that would be the end of the world, but Fregeans go into paroxyms at the mention of 'psychology', because they fear that it destroys objectivity. That may be because they haven't understood thought properly. |
| 12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
| Full Idea: We have not finished deciding what Fido is when we can pick him out from his surroundings at any one time. ...Knowing what Fido is depends on knowing roughly within what limits his flux of parts is tolerable. | |
| From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: I like this. We don't know the world until we know its modal characteristics (its powers or dispositions). Have you 'individuated' a hand grenade if you think it is a nice ornament? |
| 12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
| Full Idea: A sortal noun for a kind of continuant tells us, among other things, under what conditions the object continues to exist and under what conditions it ceases to exist. | |
| From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: This sounds blatantly false. If you know something is a 'snake', that doesn't tell you how hot it must get before the snakes die. Obviously if you know all about snakes (from studying individual snakes!), then you know a lot about the next snake. |