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9 ideas
1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Why will a man be a two-footed terrestrial animal and not an animal and terrestrial? Assumptions do not make it necessary that what is predicated form a unity - rather, it is as if the same man were musical and literate. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 92a30) |
1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A unit is a positionless substance, and a point a substance having position. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 87a36) |
12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If a definition is the recognition of some essence, it is clear that such items are not essences. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 90b17) | |
A reaction: So definitions are not themselves essences (as some modern thinkers claim). The idea seems obvious to me, but it is a warning against a simplistic view of Aristotelian essences, and a reminder that such things are real, not verbal. |
17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whatever is predicated in what something is is necessary. | |
From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 96b03) | |
A reaction: This does NOT say that the essence is just the necessities. He goes on to say to say separately that certain properties of a triplet are part of the essence, as well as being necessary. This shows the nature of a thing is also necessary. |
11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: As Aristotle uses the term 'essence', only those properties which are mentioned in or relatively close to the starting points of the science will be essential. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation II | |
A reaction: I take this to be the correct way to understand Aristotelian essence - as something understood by its role in scientific explanations. We may, of course, work back to the starting point of a science, by disentangling the mess in the middle. |
1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
Full Idea: Identity supposes an uninterrupted continuance of existence….Otherwise we must suppose a being to exist after it has ceased to exist, and to have existed before it was produced, which are manifest contradictions. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: I take the point to be that if something is supposed to survive a gap in its existence, that must imply that it somehow exists during the gap. If a light flashes on and off, is it really a new entity each time? |
21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
Full Idea: All bodies, as they consist of innumerable parts, are subject to continual changes of their substance. When such changes are gradual, because language could not afford a different name for each state, it retains the same name and is considered the same. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: This is hard to deny. We could hardly rename a child each morning. Simlarly, we can't have a unique name for each leaf on a tree. Economy of language explains a huge amount in philosophy. |
21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
Full Idea: Every man of common sense has a clear and distinct notion of identity. If you ask for a definition of identity, I confess I can give none. It is too simple a notion. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: 'Identical' seems to be a two-place predicate, but the only strict way two things can be identical is if there is actually just one thing. In which case just drop the word 'identity' (instead of defining it), and say there is just one thing here. |
1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
Full Idea: Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6) | |
A reaction: This doesn't mean that Reid thinks there is nothing more to the identity than their similitude. But he, like Hume, denies that there is personal identity at any given instant. Reid is better at criticism than at formulating his own theory. |