display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
| 5533 | Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Objects in themselves are not known to us at all. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B045/A30) | |
| A reaction: It is the phrase "at all" which is interesting. It suggests that Kant is in no way a representative realist, though it is hard to place him within the labels of phenomenalism/idealism/anti-realism. |
| 21449 | The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as a priori conditions. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B126/A93) | |
| A reaction: Does Kant have an a priori insight that process philosophy, or philosophy based entirely on relations, are wrong? |
| 5550 | A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A substance is something that could exist as a subject but never as a mere predicate. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B149) | |
| A reaction: Interesting to see Kant asserting the idea of substance a century after many philosophers thought they had dispensed with this Aristotelian notion (e.g. Ideas 3628 and Idea 2714). It has crept back into modern metaphysics too (e.g. in Wiggins). |
| 21451 | All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant] |
| Full Idea: All appearances contain that which persists (substance) as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination (i.e. the way in which the object exists). ...[2nd ed] In all change of appearances substance persists. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B224/A182) | |
| A reaction: This is a full-blooded commitment by Kant to the traditional Aristotelian concept of a substance which endures through the change in its accidental features. Though in Kant's case the commitment is 'transcendental', not realist. |
| 5564 | Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Since all effect consists in that which happens, consequently in the changeable, which indicates succession in time, the ultimate subject of the changeable is therefore that which persists, as the substratum of everything that changes, i.e. the substance. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B250/A205) | |
| A reaction: The idea that 'something' changes seems to involve a commitment to substances, but not if one thing is replaced by another. It is not clear that the abandonment of the concept of substance leads to a total collapse of our metaphysics. |
| 5626 | An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The principle of persistence is one that anticipates experience just as much as that of causality. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B795/A767) | |
| A reaction: This is the notion that identity is an indefinable basic of our understanding. He is objecting to Hume, who, of course, thought persistance was just an experience. Personally I persistance to be a posteriori, but how else could things exist? |
| 7576 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley] |
| Full Idea: Kant said that the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is true only at the level of concepts; two concepts having identical properties are the same concept; the principle is not true at the level of particulars given in sensory experience. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: Good. I would think that should be the last word on that particular subject. ...Suppose, though, that two people had identical concepts with identical properties, but believed that the extensions (application to particulars) were different? |
| 14509 | If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant] |
| Full Idea: In the case of two drops of water one can completely abstract from all inner difference (of quality and quantity), and it is enough that they be intuited in different places at the same time in order for them to be held to be numerically different. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B319/A263) | |
| A reaction: Adams points out that this is the same idea as Max Black's famous two spheres thought experiment. We assume that all the water drops are distinct from one another, even if we are unable to perceive the fact. Best explanation. |