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3 ideas
13387 | Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine] |
Full Idea: There is no denying the access of power that accrues to our conceptual scheme through the positing of abstract objects. | |
From: Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], §5) | |
A reaction: This seems right, both in its use of the word 'posit', and in its general pragmatic claim. So why? If they enable us to grapple with the world better, it must be because of their power of generalisation. They are nets thrown over chunks of reality. |
8277 | I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine] |
Full Idea: To adapt Quine's famous slogan ('no entity without identity'), I prefer to say 'no object without identity'. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], p.52) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 7.1 | |
A reaction: Quine was trying to make us all more scientific, but Lowe is closer to common sense. The sky is an entity, most of us would say, but with very shaky identity-conditions. A wave of the sea is a good example. |
13730 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Equality has caused much grief for modal logic. Many of the problems, which have struck at the heart of the coherence of modal logic, stem from the apparent violations of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.1) | |
A reaction: Thus when I say 'I might have been three inches taller', presumably I am referring to someone who is 'identical' to me, but who lacks one of my properties. A simple solution is to say that the person is 'essentially' identical. |