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Ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Explanations in reply to Mr Bradley' and 'The Logic of What Might Have Been'

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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
     Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III)
     A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
     Full Idea: By admitting possible worlds of unlimited variation and recombination, I simply abandon true metaphysical essentialism. By my lights, any property is attached to anything in some possible world or other. I am a closet radical anti-essentialist.
     From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II)
     A reaction: Salmon includes impossible worlds within his scheme of understanding. It strikes me that this is metaphysical system which tells us nothing about how things are: it is sort of 'logical idealist'. Later he talks of 'we essentialists'.