display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish (as Aristotle and Fine do) between what belongs to the essence of an object, and what merely follows from the essence of an object. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.1) | |
A reaction: This can help to clarify the confusions that result from treating necessary properties as if they were essential. |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Individual instances of a kind of phenomenon, in Aristotle's view, can only be perceived through sense-perception; but they are not the proper subject-matter of scientific demonstration and definition. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: A footnote (11) explains that this is because they involve syllogisms, which require universals. I take Aristotle, and anyone sensible, to rest on individual essences, but inevitably turn to generic essences when language becomes involved. |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: If an object has a certain property essentially, then it follows that the object has the property necessarily (if it exists). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.2) | |
A reaction: She is citing Fine, who says that the converse (necessity implying essence) is false. I agree with that. I also willing to challenge the first bit. I suspect an object can retain identity and lose essence. Coma patient; broken clock; aged athlete. |