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1211
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Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke]
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Full Idea:
When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure that it is that very thing and not another, ..and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.01)
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A reaction:
It seems to me that Locke starts by getting it right, that we instantly perceive identities, but then confuses it with some intellectual process of comparison, and ends up thinking that idea of things is identity of ideas, which it isn't.
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12508
|
Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke]
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Full Idea:
The identity of living creatures depends not on a mass of the same particles. An oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and the lopped, is still the same oak. ..the oak is the organisation of its parts to receive and distribute nourishment.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.03)
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A reaction:
Compare Idea 12507. The problem case is then inanimate matter which has a structure, such as a statue or a crystal. Living things seem to be individuated by function, so does that apply to statues? Suppose you hollow out a solid statue?
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7945
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We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Everyone upon inquiry into his thoughts, will find that he has no other idea of any substance, but what he has barely of those sensible qualities, with a supposition of such a substratum as give support to those qualities, which he observes exist united.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.23.06)
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A reaction:
This is the orginal of the 'substratum' view of substances. The whole problem is captured here, because this is an empiricist trying not to extend his ontology beyond experience, but trying to explain unity, identity and continuity.
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16796
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Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau]
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Full Idea:
The most popular reading of Locke is that he endorses multiple, coinciding, material substances. In a human being, for example, there would be a body, a man and a person.
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From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 30.4
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A reaction:
Since he says that substances can only coincide if they are of different types then this may be a misreading, as Pasnau implies.
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12507
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A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Whilst they exist united together, the mass consisting of the same atoms must be the same mass, ...but if one of those atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same mass, or the same body.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.03)
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A reaction:
This is clearly a 'strict and philosophical' usage, rather than a 'loose and popular' one - indeed, so strict as to be ridiculous. Knowing what we do now of quantum activity (emission of photons etc), we would abandon 'identity' totally.
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12498
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Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke]
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Full Idea:
We come to the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting combinations of simple ideas that exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.23.03)
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A reaction:
This is Locke's concept of essence, as the source which gives rise to the other properties of a thing. Locke waxes sarcastic about this 'I know not what' in things, but he never actually denies it. He just thinks it is beyond our grasp.
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12520
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The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke]
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Full Idea:
When I enquire into the real essence, from which all the properties flow, I cannot discover it: the farthest I can go, is only to presume that it being nothing but body, its essence must be the figure, size and connection of its solid parts.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.31.06)
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A reaction:
I say we have now discovered the essence of gold (for example), and that 'figure, size and connection' of parts is quite a good account of what we have discovered, namely the 79 protons, the neutrons, and the electron shell, with forces.
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16038
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Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
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Full Idea:
It may be that for Locke 'real essences' and 'internal constitution' cannot be synonymous because, according to Locke, real essences are unknowable, but internal constitutions are knowable.
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From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.23.12) by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence §4.4
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A reaction:
[He cites Susanna Goodin 1998; evidence for the first half is 4.6.5 and 12, and for the second is 2.23.12] One suggestion [citing 4.6.11] is that essence includes the powers, but constitution is the material components.
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15992
|
Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Anyone who observes their different qualities can hardly doubt that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are, in their internal constitution, as different from one another as several of those which are ranked under different specific names.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.10.20)
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A reaction:
I take this to agree with Aristotle, and disagree with the medieval scholastic view that essences pertain to species. Locke and I think that the so-called essences of natural kinds and sortal classes are just loose inductive generalisations.
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12539
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If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke]
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Full Idea:
If anyone thinks that a man, a horse, an animal, a plant, are distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think nature to be very liberal, making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horse, all bestowed upon Bucephalus.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.32)
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A reaction:
This is a powerful argument in favour of individual essences, and strongly against kind essences. Locke at his best, I would say.
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11155
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Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in substances, unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.15)
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A reaction:
Fine cites this as following the Aristotelian definitional account of essence, rather than the account in terms of necessities. Locke goes on to distinguish 'real' from 'nominal' essence.
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12560
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We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke]
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Full Idea:
What other qualities necessarily co-exist with a substance we cannot know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which in their primary qualities we can go but a very little way in, and in secondary qualities we know no connexion at all.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.06.07)
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A reaction:
His concept of essence is precisely that which gives rise to the collection of a thing's properties, so his doubts here are consistent. I take the modern position to be an optimist reading of Locke, that actually we can identify the substances.
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16028
|
Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
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Full Idea:
For Locke, a real essence is what makes something what it is, and in the case of physical substances, it is the underlying physical cause of the object's observable qualities.
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From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence Intro
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A reaction:
A helpful summary from a Locke expert. Is 'what it is' its type, or its individuality? Is the 'underlying cause' sufficiently coherent, or is it just a tangle of unseen activities?
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12305
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Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
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Full Idea:
For Locke the real essence of a thing is a set of properties which determine all the other properties of that thing [3.3.15], so essential properties are not retained during any change, and there is no real knowledge of the essence of things.
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From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03) by Irving M. Copi - Essence and Accident p.712
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A reaction:
Although I like the Aristotelian view, this account of Locke's must be taken seriously. Compare Idea 12304. If Aristotelian essence founds scientific knowledge, then a thing with varying behaviour has a varying essence.
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15985
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It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
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Full Idea:
It is as impossible that two things, partaking exactly of the same real essence, should have different properties, as that two figures partaking in the same real essence of a circle, should have different properties.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.17)
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A reaction:
Two circles could be of relatively different size, so we deduce from that that size is not essential. Hence essence of gold seems to be defined as those respects in which two samples of gold never vary. But that might be superficial…
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12534
|
We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
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Full Idea:
We can never know what are the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.19)
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A reaction:
Excellent. This is a splendid reason why we should not make the mistake of thinking that essence consists of necessary properties.
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13434
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In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea, signified by some general name, comes into his mind.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.04)
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A reaction:
This wouldn't stop an individual having a distinct essence, if essences are distinctive combinations of these species qualities. Thus if my dog is particularly ferocious, it combines the species of dog and the species of ferocious in a unique way.
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12306
|
'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
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Full Idea:
Locke was more interested in 'nominal essences'. ...The abstract idea of various particular substances that resemble each other ..determines a sort or a species, the 'nominal essence', for "everything contained in that idea is essential to that sort".
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From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Irving M. Copi - Essence and Accident p.712
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A reaction:
[He refers us to Locke 'Essay' 3.3, and others] This seems to be the sortals espoused by Wiggins, so is he more of a Lockean than an Aristotelian? He's a slippery fish. Knowing the sort is said by Locke to be the key to knowledge.
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13433
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Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Essence, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts; ..take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.04)
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A reaction:
The claim seems to be that if you refer to 'the dog', you instantly see its doggy essence, but if you refer to 'Fido' you see no such thing. But he is confusing the name with the idea. 'Fido' reveals no essence, but my idea of my beloved dog does.
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12557
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Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Our ideas of substance being supposed copies, and referred to archetypes within us, must still be taken from something that does or has existed; they must not consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.04.12)
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A reaction:
This is a begrudging concession from Locke, who has been rather sarcastic about our supposed knowledge of substance. His is a realist about the physical world, and rightly says that our ideas are shaped by externals. We just don't have the evidence.
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12525
|
The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke]
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Full Idea:
The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few lines; ...so I imagine it is in substances, their real essences lie in a little compass, though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.32.24)
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A reaction:
This is the clearest evidence I can find that Locke firmly believed in real essence of substances, despite all his sarcasm about anyone who claimed to know what they are. He evidently knows at least one real essence, namely that of the triangle.
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13431
|
A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke]
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Full Idea:
A space between three lines is the real as well as nominal essence of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to which the name is annexed, but the very Essentia or Being of the thing itself, that foundation from which all its properties flow.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.18)
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A reaction:
Highly significant, coming from a famous doubter of essences. It seems to me that Locke would accept that we know have the essences of innumberable physical entities, which seemed impossible in his day.
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12547
|
We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Though we see the yellow, and upon trial find the weight, malleableness, fusibility and fixedness of gold, yet because no one of these has evident dependence or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot know if four are there, the fifth will be also.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.14)
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A reaction:
Thus it is that knowledge of necessary properties cannot lead us to knowledge of essence, because explanatory dependence is in the opposite direction. The point of knowing essences is to gain increased powers of prediction.
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12503
|
Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
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Full Idea:
In this consists identity, when the ideas a thing is attributed to vary not at all from what they were at that moment, wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.24.01)
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A reaction:
Since we recognise that we might, in odd circumstances, have the identical idea while the object has been swapped, this is wrong. It sounds like the identity of indiscernibles. Identity is a concept applied to reality, not to ideas.
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12505
|
One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke]
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Full Idea:
One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning. …That therefore that had one beginning is the same thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same but divers.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.01)
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A reaction:
Chris Hughes has a nice example of a bicycle which is dismantled, parts are swapped with another, then the originals collected up and reassembled, which appears to give the bike two beginnings. This is necessity of origin, not essentiality.
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16795
|
Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
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Full Idea:
It is one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if Person, Man and Substance are three names standing for three different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to the name, such must be the identity.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.07)
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A reaction:
It might be better to say that two things can only be 'the same' in some respect. You can say 'in some respects they are the same', without citing the respects.
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12504
|
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
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Full Idea:
We don't conceive it possible that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place and time...When, therefore, we demand whether any thing be the same or no, it refers to something that existed at a time and place, and was the same with itself.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.01)
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A reaction:
I find the notion of 'self-identity' puzzling. I've always taken it to be a logicians' idea, but Locke seems to arrive at it by looking for whatever is identical with some original object, and the floating relation having to hook back onto itself.
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