Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths', 'The Powers Metaphysics' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
23772 If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE]
     Full Idea: If objects are bundles of properties …they must be robust enough to enter into building relations with one another such that they can form objects.
     From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.5)
     A reaction: A very nice point. The Humean bundle view of objects just seems to take properties to be 'impressions' or verbal predicates, but they must have causal powers to be a grounding for ontology.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
12685 Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
     Full Idea: I would define categorical properties as those whose identities depend only on the kinds of structures they represent.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3 n8)
     A reaction: Aha. So categorical properties would be much more perspicaciously labelled as 'structural' properties. Why does philosophical terminology make it all more difficult than it needs to be?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12679 A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
     Full Idea: A distinctive set of intrinsic properties for a given kind is called a 'real essence'.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: Note that he thinks essence is a set of properties (rather than what gives rise to the properties), and that it is kinds (and not individuals) which have real essences, and that one role of the properties is to be 'distinctive' of the kind. Cf. Oderberg.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
23788 Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE]
     Full Idea: 'Perdurantism' is the view that objects persist by being composed of temporal parts. When it is commonly combined with the eternalist account of the ontology of time, the result is known as 'four-dimensionalism'.
     From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 08.1)
     A reaction: At last, a clear account of the distinction between these two! They're both wrong. He says the result is the spatiotemporal 'worm' view (i.e. one temporal extended thing, rather than a collection of parts).