Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'Noneism or Allism?' and 'A Philosophy of Boredom'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Holes are things of such a kind that they can coincide without being identical - as are, for example, shadows and spots of light.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 1)
     A reaction: His point is that they thereby fail one of the standard tests for being an 'object'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Things must have an essence, in the sense of 'what it is to be the individual of that kind', or it would make no sense to say we can talk or think comprehendingly about things at all. If we don't know what it is, how can we think about it?
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)
     A reaction: Lowe presents this as a sort of Master Argument for essences. I think he is working with the wrong notion of essence. All he means is that things must have identities to be objects of thought. Why equate identity with essence, and waste a good concept?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
     Full Idea: To know something's essence is not to be acquainted with some further thing of a special kind, but simply to understand what exactly that thing is.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)
     A reaction: I think he is wrong about this, or at least is working with an unhelpful notion of essence. Identity is one thing, and essence is another. I take essences to be certain selected features of things, which explain their nature.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Any individual thing must be a thing of some general kind - because, at the very least, it must belong to some ontological category.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)
     A reaction: Where does the law that 'everything must have a category' come from? I'm baffled by remarks of this kind. Where do we get the categories from? From observing the individuals. So which has priority? Not the categories. Is God a kind?