Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'On a supposed right to lie' and 'Logic for Philosophy'

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2 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13920 Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Any individual thing must be a thing of some general kind - because, at the very least, it must belong to some ontological category.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)
     A reaction: Where does the law that 'everything must have a category' come from? I'm baffled by remarks of this kind. Where do we get the categories from? From observing the individuals. So which has priority? Not the categories. Is God a kind?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
13702 The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
     Full Idea: The identity of indiscernibles (∀x∀y(∀X(Xx↔Xy)→x=y) is necessarily true, provided that we construe 'property' very broadly, so that 'being a member of such-and-such set' counts as a property.
     From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 5.4.3)
     A reaction: Sider's example is that if the two objects are the same they must both have the property of being a member of the same singleton set, which they couldn't have if they were different.