19379
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The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
That there should be a persistent law of the series, which involves the future states of that which we conceive to be the same, is exactly what I say constitutes it as the same substance.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 4 'Applying'
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A reaction:
The 'law of the series' is a bit dubious, but it is reasonable to say that a substance is individuated by its coherent progress of change over time. Disjointed change would imply an absence of substance. The law of the series is called 'primitive force'.
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11842
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If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
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Full Idea:
We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
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From:
C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
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A reaction:
Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.
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13178
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Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Things that differ in place must express their place, that is, they must express the things surrounding, and thus they must be distinguished not only by place, that is, not by an extrinsic denomination alone, as is commonly thought.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20)
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A reaction:
This is an unusual view, which has some attractions, as it enables the relations of a thing to individuate it, while maintaining that this is a real difference in character.
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19411
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In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
In nature any straight line you may take is individually different from any other straight line you may find. Accordingly, it cannot come about that two bodies are perfectly equal and alike.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1703.06.20)
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A reaction:
Leibniz was very good at persuasive examples! It remains unclear, though, why he takes the Identity of Indiscernibles to be a necessary truth, when he seems to have only observed it from experience. This is counter to his other principles.
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