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2 ideas
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
Full Idea: It appears that substance has essential properties: it is of the essence of substance that it individuates, and it is of the essence of substance that it bears properties. | |
From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 06.2) | |
A reaction: The point being that substances are not 'bear', because they have a role to perform, and a complete blank can't fulfil a role. We can't take substance, though, seriously in ontology. It is just a label for distinct individuals. |
16673 | Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi] |
Full Idea: Quantity or extension adds absolutely nothing really distinct to the quantified matter or to the extended and quantified form, except perhaps the union and location and position of those parts. | |
From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II:58,II:440), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1 | |
A reaction: Other views seem to say that the Quantity provides the extension, but he seems to take that as given. |