display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: It does not seem altogether arbitrary to treat the structure of the world (the 'form' of the world) in a different way to the nodes in the structure (the 'matter' of the world). | |
From: John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 2.5) | |
A reaction: An interesting contemporary spin put on Aristotle's original view. Hawthorne is presenting the Aristotle account as a sort of 'structuralism' about nature. |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: An individual essence is a profile that is necessary and sufficient for some particular thing. | |
From: John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: By 'for' he presumably means for the thing to have an existence and a distinct identity. If it retained its identity, but didn't function any more, would that be loss of essence? |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong - as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to perceive Body. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.270) | |
A reaction: For the opposite case he suggests a man running, talking or sleeping. He doesn't mention essential natures, but this is clearly correct. We might say that they are properties which need to be mentioned in a full definition. |