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Ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Naming and Necessity lectures' and 'On Husserl'

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19 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties

17647	Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
	Full Idea: The difficulty is that Kripke individuates objects by their modal properties, by what they (essentially) could and could not be. Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism; it can not be used to ground it.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Hilary Putnam - Why there isn't a ready-made world 'Essences'

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

16995	Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
	Full Idea: This table is composed of molecules. …Could anything be this very object and not be composed of molecules? …It's hard to imagine under what circumstances you would have this very object and find that it is not composed of molecules.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)
	A reaction: This is the thesis of essentiality of constitution. Given that it is square, might it have been round? Yes. Given that it is wood, might it have been metal? No? Given that it is molecular, might it have been plasma? No. ….Maybe.

17047	If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
	Full Idea: Though we can imagine a table identical to this one in this room, but made of ice (or different wood), it seems to me that this is not to imagine this table as made of ice, but to imagine another table, resembling this one, made of ice.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
	A reaction: This is the Necessity of Constitution thesis, which I doubt. Might this table have had one leg different? Why not? Then you have a Ship of Theseus question. How much could be different? How much of the constitution is necessary?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence

5450	For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
	Full Idea: Kripke makes the origin of an organism essential to it, according to Putnam the fundamental physical properties of a thing are essential, Wiggins sees an organism's essence in belonging to a particular kind, etc.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.179
	A reaction: This is helpful for seeing where the problems remain, if you embrace essentialism (as I feel inclined to do). It is vital to remember Putnam's point, that we could suddenly discover that cats are alien robots. This seems to undermine Kripke and Wiggins.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

17055	Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
	Full Idea: It is part of the nature of gold as we have it to be an element with atomic number 79.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
	A reaction: The word 'nature' directly invokes Aristotle's concept of an essence. Scientific essentialism arises from the idea that by discovering the atomic number, we have somehow 'arrived' at the essence, and enquiry is reaching its terminus.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

16997	An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
	Full Idea: When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)
	A reaction: This seems to equate essence with necessary properties, which is the view attacked nicely be Fine in 1994. I take essence (in Aristotle's sense) to be quite different from necessary properties (in being non-trivial, for example).

17045	De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
	Full Idea: De re modality is an object having essential properties.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
	A reaction: [Plucked out of context] It is because Kripke says there are necessities about things, and not just about statements about things, that he has caused a revival of essentialism. Fine has famously said modality depends on essence.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

17030	Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
	Full Idea: Important properties of an object need not be essential, unless 'importance' is used as a synonym for essence.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2)
	A reaction: Kripke's examples are the writings of Aristotle and the actions of Hitler, but these don't strike me as being 'properties' of those people. They are not intrinsic. Kripke, of course, is concerned with how we identify them, not who they actually are.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species

16955	Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
	Full Idea: Kripke stresses that membership of a single animal species requires identity or similarity of internal structure. In my view, what matters is genetic affinity - a common descent. Internal structure is merely a clue.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Michael Dummett - Could There Be Unicorns? 2
	A reaction: The crucial test question would be whether we can make a tiger artificially (even constructing the DNA). I would say that if you make a tiger, that's a tiger, so Kripke is right and Dummett is wrong. The species is what it is, not where it came from.

16996	Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
	Full Idea: Suppose Nixon actually turned out to be an automaton. That might happen. But that is a question about our knowledge. The question of whether he might not have been a human being, given that he is one, is not a question about knowledge.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)
	A reaction: Given that you are sitting, might you be standing? Yes. Given that you are human, might you be non-human? No. Maybe!

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

13971	Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
	Full Idea: Kripke's first (good) route to the necessary a posteriori is based on the idea that certain properties of objects that they can be known to have only a posteriori, may be known a priori to be essential properties of anything that has them.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Scott Soames - Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori p.180
	A reaction: Interesting, and a key issue. I think this is precisely where I disagree with the Kripkean view of necessities. Logicians want to know a priori what is essential for identity, but scientists want to know what makes things tick. See Kripke on pain.

12100	An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
	Full Idea: For Kripke an object's essence simply consists of its necessary properties. ...His essential properties of individual objects follow from our intuitions about their identity. ...They are of three sorts: of origin, of sortals, and of material.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6 n3
	A reaction: This is because Kripke is only interested in identity, whereas Aristotle is interested in explanation. The sorts are efficient, formal, material. Big Q: could Aristotle's account of essence do all the work that is required of essences by Kripke?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time

16991	No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
	Full Idea: Adequate necessary and sufficient conditions for identity which do not beg the question are very rare. …I don't know of such conditions for identity of material objects over time, or for people. Everyone knows what a problem this is.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)
	A reaction: Typical of Kripke, who only seems to commit to conclusions suggested to him by his modal logic, and is baffled by almost everything else. I think one can at least attempt an essentialist approach to this problem.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential

11867	If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
	Full Idea: Perhaps Kripke's argument for the necessity to a thing of its actual origin is that the speculator has to be able to rebut the charge that he has lost his grasp of his subject of discourse if he conceives of this subject with changed parents or origin.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 4.10
	A reaction: On the whole Wiggins opposes necessity of origin (cf. Forbes, who defends it). If this idea is right, then any means of ensuring reference will do the job, and it clearly wouldn't be an argument that guaranteed necessity of origin.

12018	Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
	Full Idea: If we generalise what Kripke says about the Queen, then he is arguing that the parents of any organism are essentially the parents of that organism.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 6.1
	A reaction: It strikes me that we have to be extremely careful in specifying what it is that Kripke is saying. I take it that either Kripke is saying something rather uninteresting, or he is saying what Forbes suggests. Parenthood is essential, not just necessary.

17046	Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
	Full Idea: Could the Queen - could this woman herself - have been born of different parents from the parents from whom she actually came?
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
	A reaction: Tricky! No, because the past is fixed? Could the Queen have visited Russia when she was 20? I suppose so. Might she not have had parents, given who she is? I don't see why not. Could this desk have been made by someone else? Why not?

8274	Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
	Full Idea: Against Kripke's thesis of 'necessity of origin' I will just point out the intuitive force of the claim that Socrates - that very person - could, logically, have had no beginning to his existence at all, or have come into existence ex nihilo.
	From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], p.110-) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 6.5
	A reaction: It also strikes me that one base-pair difference in his DNA (by a mutation, or a fractionally different parent) would still leave him as Socrates. People are not good candidates for 'rigid' designation. Counterparts seems a better account here.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

17036	Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
	Full Idea: If the man who invented bifocals was the first Postmaster General of the United States - that they were one and the same - it's contingently true. …So when you make identity statements using descriptions, that can be a contingent fact.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2)

17038	If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
	Full Idea: If Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the same, then in no other possible world can they be different.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2)
	A reaction: If we ask whether one object could possibly be two objects, and deny that possibility, then Kripke's novel thought seems just right and obvious.