Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Rules for the Direction of the Mind' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought

8489	The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
	Full Idea: I regard a regular definition of 'object' as impossible, since it is too simple to admit of logical analysis. Briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.32)
	A reaction: Here is the core of the programme for deriving our ontology from our logic and language, followed through by Russell and Quine. Once we extend objects beyond the physical, it becomes incredibly hard to individuate them.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

12775	Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Important relations are duration (order of successive things) and position (order of coexisting things) and interaction. Position without a thing mediating is presence. Beyond these is connection when things move one another. Thus things seem to be one.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is the best account I can find of his epistemological angle on the unity of things. They are symptoms of the inner power of unification, and he says that God sees these relations most clearly.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

12776	Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Every substance is alive.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05)
	A reaction: The most charitable interpretation of this is that substances are what have unity, and the best model of unity that we can grasp is the unity of an organism. The less charitable view is that he literally thinks a pebble is 'alive'. Hm.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier

12753	A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Some realising thing must bring it about that composite substance contains something substantial besides monads, otherwise composites will be mere phenomena. The scholastics' active and passive powers are the substantial bond I am urging.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.01.13), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9
	A reaction: [compressed] This appears to be a major retreat, in the last year of Leibniz's life, from the full monadology he had espoused. How do monads connect to matter, and thus unify it? He is returning to Aristotelian hylomorphism.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts

12781	A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An aggregate, but not a composite substance, is resolved into parts. A composite substance only needs the coming together of parts, but is not essentially constituted by them, otherwise it would be an aggregate.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
	A reaction: The point is that there is more to some things than there mere parts. Only some unifying principle, in addition to the mere parts, bestows a unity. Mereology is a limited activity if it has nothing to say about this issue.