8489
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The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
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Full Idea:
I regard a regular definition of 'object' as impossible, since it is too simple to admit of logical analysis. Briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place.
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From:
Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.32)
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A reaction:
Here is the core of the programme for deriving our ontology from our logic and language, followed through by Russell and Quine. Once we extend objects beyond the physical, it becomes incredibly hard to individuate them.
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13280
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Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The statue and the clay appear to differ in modal properties (such as being able to survive squashing), and temporal properties (coming into existence after the lump of clay), and in constitution (only the statue is constituted of the clay).
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2)
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A reaction:
I think the modal properties are the biggest problem here. You can't say a thing and its constitution are different objects, as they are necessarily connected. Structure comes into existence at t, but the structure isn't the whole object.
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14496
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Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The notion of structure or form, far from being a mysterious and causally inert invention of philosophers, lies at the very center of many scientific and other rigorous endeavours, such as mathematics, logic, linguistics, chemistry and music.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
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A reaction:
This echoes my own belief exactly, and places Aristotle at the centre of the modern stage. Her list of subjects is intriguing, and will need a bit of thought.
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13279
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There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The view that constitution is identity has many versions: eliminativism (van Inwagen), identity relative to time (Gallois), identity relativized to sort (Geach), four-dimensionalism (Lewis, Sider), contingent identity (Gibbard), dominant kinds (Burke).
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2 n17)
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A reaction:
[she offers other names- useful footnote] Eliminativism says there is no identity. Gallois's view is Heraclitus. Geach seems to deny nature, since sorts are partly conventional. 4-D, nah! Gibbard: it could be the thing but lack its identity? Kinds wrong.
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13266
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Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The modern theory of parts and wholes was intended primarily to replace set theory; in this way, wholes came out looking as much like sets as they possibly could, without set theory's commitment to an infinite hierarchy of abstract objects.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
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A reaction:
A very nice clarificatory remark, which explains well this rather baffling phenomenon of people who think there is nothing more to a whole than a pile of parts, as if a scrap heap were the same as a fleet of motor cars.
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14500
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Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
A commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities that are numerically distinct from their parts (by Leibniz's Law, they don't share all of their properties - the parts typically exist, but the whole doesn't, prior to its creation).
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.1)
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A reaction:
Presumably in classical mereology no act of 'creation' is needed, since all the parts in the universe already form all the possible wholes into which they might combine, however bizarrely.
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