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14748
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The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
What is true of the many is not exactly what is true of the one. After all they are many while it is one. The number of the many is six, whereas the number of the fusion is one. The singletons of the many are distinct from the singleton of the one.
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From:
David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.6)
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A reaction:
I wouldn't take this objection to be conclusive. 'Some pebbles' seem to be many, but a 'handful of pebbles' seem to be one, where the physical situation might be identical. If they are not identical, then the non-identity is purely conceptual.
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6129
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Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
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Full Idea:
Lewis says that the parts of a thing are identical with the whole they compose, calling his view 'composition as identity', which is the claim that a physical object is 'nothing over and above its parts'.
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From:
report of David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], p.84-7) by Trenton Merricks - Objects and Persons §I.IV
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A reaction:
The ontological economy of this view is obviously attractive, but I don't agree with it. You certainly can't say that all identity consists entirely of composition by parts, because the parts need identity to get the view off the ground.
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15519
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Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
A trout-turkey is inhomogeneous, disconnected, not in contrast with its surroundings. It is not cohesive, not causally integrated, not a causal unit in its impact on the rest of the world. It is not carved at the joints. That doesn't affect its existence.
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From:
David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.5)
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A reaction:
A nice pre-emptive strike against all the reasons why anyone might think more is needed for unity than a mereological fusion.
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15521
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Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Given a prior commitment to cats, a commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment. The fusion is nothing over and above the cats that compose it. It just is them. They just are it. Together or separately, the cats are the same portion of Reality.
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From:
David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.6)
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A reaction:
The two extremes of ontology are that there are no objects, or that every combination is an object. Until reading this I thought Lewis was in the second camp, but this sounds like object-nihilism, as in Van Inwagen and Merricks.
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14244
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Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Lewis employs mereological fusion as his sole method of making one thing out of many, and fusion is notorious for the way it flattens out and thereby obliterates distinctions.
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From:
comment on David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991]) by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? 3.1
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A reaction:
I take this to be a key point in the discussion of mereology in ontological contexts. As a defender of intrinsic structural essences, I have no use for mereological fusions, and look for a quite different identity for 'wholes'.
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