Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Boundary Stones of Thought', 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good' and 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory'

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2 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: A borderline red-orange object satisfies the disjunctive predicate 'red or orange', even though it satisfies neither 'red' or 'orange'. When applied to adjacent bands of colour, the disjunction 'sweeps up' objects which are reddish-orange.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.5)
     A reaction: Rumfitt offers a formal principle in support of this. There may be a problem with 'adjacent'. Different colour systems will place different colours adjacent to red. In other examples the idea of 'adjacent' may make no sense. Rumfitt knows this!
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: On Sainsbury's picture, a colour has an extension that it has by virtue of its place in a network of contrary colour classifications. Something is determined to be 'red' by being a colour incompatible with orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.5)
     A reaction: Along with Idea 18839, this gives quite a nice account of vagueness, by requiring a foil to the vague predicate, and using the disjunction of the predicate and its foil to handle anything caught in between them.