display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
| 23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Objects make up the substance of the world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.021) | |
| A reaction: He doesn't say here that the objects are physical, and may be including Frege's abstract objects. His concept of substance seems more like Spinoza than Aristotle. |
| 23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Objects are simple | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.02) | |
| A reaction: Presumably all his objects are 'simples', and what we think of as normal objects are counted by LW as 'facts'. |
| 23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Substance is what remains independently of what is the case. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.024) | |
| A reaction: He sees what is the case as comprised of objects, so substance is even more basic. It seems close to Spinoza's single-substance view. |
| 22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein explicitly said that to know an object I must know all its internal properties. ...Internal properties have form and content; form is 'possibility of occurrence in atomic facts' (2.0141), content is its being that specific object (2.0233). | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.01231) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp' | |
| A reaction: [check original quote] This seems to be an essentialist view of (formal) objects. See Potter 347-9 for discussion. The 'external properties' of an object are the atomic facts in which it occurs. |
| 6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It is self-evident that identity is not a relation between objects. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5301) | |
| A reaction: Part of Wittgenstein's claim that identity statements are 'pseudo-propositions'. See, in reply, the ideas of McGinn on identity. This was part of the drive that led to the extremes of logical positivism, killing metaphysics for two generations. |
| 22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Russell's definition of identity [x is y if any predicate of x is a predicate of y] won't do, because then one cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5302), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 53 'Ident' | |
| A reaction: [The Russell is in Principia] Good. Even if Leibniz is right that no two obejcts have identical properties, it is at least meaningful to consider the possibility. Russell makes it an impossibility, rather than a contingent fact. |
| 6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5303) | |
| A reaction: Wittgenstein's attack on identity. It is best (following McGinn) to only speak of resemblance between two things (possibly to a very high degree, as in two electrons). Self-identity just is identity; you can drop the word 'identity', but not the concept. |