Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Two Chief World Systems' and 'Anti-essentialism'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum

12764	For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: If we are to make sense of the bare particular theory, a property must be not just a rule for grouping individuals, but a feature of individuals in virtue of which they may be grouped.
	From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.76)
	A reaction: He is offering an objection to the thoroughly extensional account of properties that is found in standard possible worlds semantics. Quite right too. We can't give up on the common sense notion of a property.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

13742	There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: I am happy to accept universal composition, on the grounds that there are heaps, piles etc with no integral unity, and that arbitrary composites are no less unified than heaps.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1 n11)
	A reaction: The metaphysical focus is then placed on what constitutes 'integral unity', which is precisely the question which most interested Aristotle. Clearly if there is nothing more to an entity than its components, scattering them isn't destruction.

13752	The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: The notion of grounding my capture a crucial mereological distinction (missing from classical mereology) between an integrated whole with genuine unity, and a mere aggregate. x is an integrated whole if it grounds its proper parts.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 3.1)
	A reaction: That gives a nice theoretical notion, but if you remove each of the proper parts, does x remain? Is it a bare particular? I take it that it will have to be an abstract principle, the one Aristotle was aiming at with his notion of 'form'. Schaffer agrees.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

12761	An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: If necessity is explained in terms of possible worlds, ...then an essential property is a property that a thing has in all possible worlds in which it exists.
	From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.71)
	A reaction: This seems to me to be a quite shocking confusion of necessary properties with essential properties. The point is that utterly trivial properties can be necessary, but in no way part of the real essence of something.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

12763	Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: We can remain anti-essentialist while allowing some necessary properties: those essential to everything (self-identity), relational properties (being what it is), and world-indexed properties (being snub-nosed-only-in-Kronos).
	From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.73)
	A reaction: [a summary] He defined essential properties as necessary properties (Idea 12761), and now backpeddles. World-indexed properties are an invention of Plantinga, as essential properties to don't limit individuals. But they are necessary, not essential!

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

12762	Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: I argue that one cannot make semantical sense out of bare particular anti-essentialism within the framework of standard semantics for modal logic.
	From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.71)
	A reaction: Stalnaker characterises the bare particular view as ANTI-essentialist, because he has defined essence in terms of necessary properties. The bare particular seems to allow the possibility of Aristotle being a poached egg.