Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason' and 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought

10796	If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
	Full Idea: If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism?
	From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166)
	A reaction: Personally I don't think that would be the end of the world, but Fregeans go into paroxyms at the mention of 'psychology', because they fear that it destroys objectivity. That may be because they haven't understood thought properly.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

13742	There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: I am happy to accept universal composition, on the grounds that there are heaps, piles etc with no integral unity, and that arbitrary composites are no less unified than heaps.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1 n11)
	A reaction: The metaphysical focus is then placed on what constitutes 'integral unity', which is precisely the question which most interested Aristotle. Clearly if there is nothing more to an entity than its components, scattering them isn't destruction.

13752	The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: The notion of grounding my capture a crucial mereological distinction (missing from classical mereology) between an integrated whole with genuine unity, and a mere aggregate. x is an integrated whole if it grounds its proper parts.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 3.1)
	A reaction: That gives a nice theoretical notion, but if you remove each of the proper parts, does x remain? Is it a bare particular? I take it that it will have to be an abstract principle, the one Aristotle was aiming at with his notion of 'form'. Schaffer agrees.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity

10797	Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
	Full Idea: Substitutivity 'salve veritate' cannot define identity since two expressions may be everywhere intersubstitutable and not refer at all.
	From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.167)