Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Critique of Pure Reason' and 'The Principles of Mathematics'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
21449 The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant]
     Full Idea: Concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as a priori conditions.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B126/A93)
     A reaction: Does Kant have an a priori insight that process philosophy, or philosophy based entirely on relations, are wrong?
5533 Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant]
     Full Idea: Objects in themselves are not known to us at all.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B045/A30)
     A reaction: It is the phrase "at all" which is interesting. It suggests that Kant is in no way a representative realist, though it is hard to place him within the labels of phenomenalism/idealism/anti-realism.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
7781 I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell]
     Full Idea: Whatever may be an object of thought, or occur in a true or false proposition, or be counted as one, I call a term. This is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary, which I use synonymously with unit, individual, entity (being one, and existing).
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §047)
     A reaction: The claim of existence begs many questions, such as whether the non-existence of the Loch Ness Monster is an 'object' of thought.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
14166 Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is sufficient to observe that all unities are propositions or propositional concepts, and that consequently nothing that exists is a unity. If, therefore, it is maintained that things are unities, we must reply that no things exist.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §439)
     A reaction: The point, I presume, is that you end up as a nihilist about identities (like van Inwagen and Merricks) by mistakenly thinking (as Aristotle and Leibniz did) that everything that exists needs to have something called 'unity'.