Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'There are no ordinary things' and 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
16070 There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman]
     Full Idea: Eliminativism is often associated with Unger, who defends 'mereological nihilism', that there are no composite objects (objects with proper parts); there are only mereological simples (with no proper parts). The nihilist denies statues and ships.
     From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 4
     A reaction: The puzzle here is that he has a very clear notion of identity for the simples, but somehow bars combinations from having identity. So identity is simplicity? 'Complex identity' doesn't sound like an oxymoron. We're stuck if there are no simples.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?