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Ideas for 'Metaphysics: the logical approach', 'Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends'' and 'Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
3304 Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Why suppose these particles packed together constitute a macro-entity (namely, Mt Everest), whereas those, of equal number, scattered around, fail to add up to anything beyond themselves?
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 2)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
3350 Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Is being a horse an essential property of a horse? Can we so much as conceive the abstract possibility of a horse's ceasing to be a horse even while continuing to exist?
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.20)
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
3309 If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: If a soldier need not cease to exist merely because he ceases to be a soldier, there is room to doubt that the wind ceases to exist when it ceases to be a wind.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6)
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
3351 One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: One can step into the same river twice, but one must not expect to step into the same water.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.21)
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
3314 Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: With the thesis that to be as such is to be relative, the absolutist may be found to concur, but the issue turns on what it might be that a thing is supposed to be relative to. Why not itself?
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 8)
3323 Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: 'Existence' can't be glossed as self-identical (critics say) because Pegasus, even while being self-identical, fails to exist.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.11)