Combining Texts

Ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Logicism Revisited' and 'Critique of Pure Reason'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

21449	The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant]
	Full Idea: Concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as a priori conditions.
	From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B126/A93)
	A reaction: Does Kant have an a priori insight that process philosophy, or philosophy based entirely on relations, are wrong?

5533	Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant]
	Full Idea: Objects in themselves are not known to us at all.
	From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B045/A30)
	A reaction: It is the phrase "at all" which is interesting. It suggests that Kant is in no way a representative realist, though it is hard to place him within the labels of phenomenalism/idealism/anti-realism.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

14193	'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
	A reaction: A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures.

14195	If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
	A reaction: See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary.

14196	Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: The explanation of material constitution given by substance essentialism is that there are multiple objects. A person is essentially human-shaped (falling under the human sort), while their hunk of tissue is accidentally human-shaped (as tissue).
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
	A reaction: At this point sortal essentialism begins to look crazy. Persons are dubious examples (with sneaky dualism involved). A bronze statue is essentially harder to dent than a clay one, because of its bronze. If you remake it of clay, it isn't the same statue.