display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Compound objects are to be considered processes, if by ‘process’ we mean any entity for which change is essential for its continued existence. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 7) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to matter much, except to challenge those who say that reality consists of processes, and therefore not of substances. |
22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Most materialist ontologies of the past postulate that the world ultimately consists of smallest indivisible component parts that persist because they must; they are permanent. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen is notable for this view. Ingthorsson says the theory is to explain medium-sized change, while denying that anything comes to be out of nothing. Theology may lurk in the background. Simple persistance won't explain compound persistance. |
12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke] |
Full Idea: This I do say, that there are real constitutions in things from whence simple ideas flow, which we observe combin'd in them. But we distinguish particular substances into sorts or genera not by real essences or constitutions, but by observed simple ideas. | |
From: John Locke (Letters to William Molyneux [1692], 1693.01.20) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement I can find of Locke's position on essences. He is totally committed to their reality, but strongly aware of the empirical constraints which keep us from direct knowledge of them. He would be amazed by modern discoveries. |
22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Endurance and perdurance are not explanations, but are merely characterisations of persistance with the constraints imposed by either an A or a B view of time. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is 3-D asnd 4-D objects. A simple and illuminating observation. I love reading broad brush books that make all these simple connections between what seem isolated theories in philosophy. These links are the heart of the subject. |
22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: There are very obvious causal aspects to the constitution and continued existence of compound entities, especially in light of the scientific image of the world. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 6) | |
A reaction: I like this a lot. He aims to explain constitution and persistance, rather than just describing or characterising them, and causal binding seems the obvious thought. There are still intermittent and distributed objects, like a dismantled clock. |
22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: If causation involves production, then things must endure rather than perdure, because perdurance is incompatible with production, if creation ex nihilo is ruled out. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.10) | |
A reaction: That is, objects must persist over time. Cannot an account of production be given in terms of time-sliceS (or whatever)? 3-D perdurantists obviously have an account of change. He says it also needs the A-series view of time. |