Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'First-Order Modal Logic' and 'New system of communication of substances'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
     A reaction: I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The nature of substance necessarily requires and essentially involves progress or change, without which it would not have the force to act.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.144)
     A reaction: Bravo. Most metaphysical musings regarding 'substance' seem entirely wrapped up in the problem of pure identity, and forget about the role of objects in activity and change.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: Equality has caused much grief for modal logic. Many of the problems, which have struck at the heart of the coherence of modal logic, stem from the apparent violations of the Indiscernibility of Identicals.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.1)
     A reaction: Thus when I say 'I might have been three inches taller', presumably I am referring to someone who is 'identical' to me, but who lacks one of my properties. A simple solution is to say that the person is 'essentially' identical.