Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'Coherence: The Price is Right' and 'The Mind in Nature'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15476 Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
     Full Idea: I take it as obvious that any structural property involves dispositionality and, therefore, cannot be used to 'explain' dispositionality.
     From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.3)
     A reaction: I think this is the right way round. The so-called 'categorical' properties seem to be close in nature to the 'structural' properties.
15465 Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
     Full Idea: It is self-defeating to try to explain dispositionality in terms of structural states because structural states are themselves dispositional.
     From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 01.2)
     A reaction: No doubt structures have dispositions, but are they entirely dispositional? Might there be 'emergent' dispositions which can only be explained by the structure itself, rather than by the dispositions that make up the structure?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
15481 I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
     Full Idea: I favour the old idea of substratum: the haver of properties not itself had as a property. Space-time might itself be the bearer of properties, not itself borne as a property.
     From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6)
     A reaction: A very nice idea. The choice is between saying either that fundamentals like space-time and physical fields are the propertyless bearers of properties, or that they purely consist of properties (so properties are fundamental, not substrata).
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15474 Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
     Full Idea: There is no causal work for the whole that is not done by the parts, provided the complex role of the parts is fully appreciated.
     From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.1)
     A reaction: It seems like a truth that because some parts are doing particular causal work (e.g. glue), the whole can acquire causal powers that the mereological sum of parts lacks.