Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'Naming and Necessity preface' and 'Reflections on Value'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Being a physical object (as opposed to being a horse or a statue) really is our most fundamental category for dealing with the external world.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
     A reaction: This raises the interesting question of why any categories should be considered to be more 'fundamental' than others. I can only think that we perceive something to be an object fractionally before we (usually) manage to identify it.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Properties of 'being such and such specific entity' are often called 'haecceities', but this term carries the connotation of non-qualitativeness which I don't favour.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
     A reaction: The way he defines it makes it sound as if it was a category, but I take it to be more like a bare individual essence. If it has not qualities then it has no causal powers, so there could be no evidence for its existence.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
     Full Idea: It is clear from (x)□(x=x) and Leibniz's Law that identity is an 'internal' relation: (x)(y)(x=y ⊃ □x=y). What pairs (w,y) could be counterexamples? Not pairs of distinct objects, …nor an object and itself.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03)
     A reaction: I take 'internal' to mean that the necessity of identity is intrinsic to the item(s), and not imposed by some other force.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
4942 The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (not to be confused with the identity of indiscernibles) is as self-evident as the law of contradiction.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03)
     A reaction: This seems obviously correct, as it says no more than that a thing has whatever properties it has. If a difference is discerned, either you have made a mistake, or it isn't identical.