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Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics'' and 'Externalism'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
16629 By comparing qualities and features, reason can gradually infer the nature of substance [Grosseteste]
     Full Idea: Awakened reason distinguishes color from size and shape from body and then shape and size from the substance of body, and so by drawing distinctions and abstracting, it arrives at a grasp of the substance of body, which supports size, shape and color.
     From: Robert Grosseteste (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics' [1226], I.14), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.4
     A reaction: This optimistic view influenced Aquinas, and is called 'incrementalism' by Pasnau. It is the spirit of scientific essentialism, and a nice instance of inference to the best explanation (though 'substance' in itself explains virtually nothing).
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
6154 It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
     Full Idea: Some have argued that a mereological whole should not be identified with the sum of its parts on the grounds that the former possess certain properties - specifically modal and (perhaps) counterfactual properties - that the latter lacks.
     From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: I am not convinced that modal and counterfactual claims should count as properties. If my pen is heated it melts (a property), but if my pen were intelligent it could do philosophy. Intelligence is a property, but the situation isn't.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
6157 Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
     Full Idea: Tokens are dated, concrete, particular occurrences or instances; types are the general properties that these occurrences exemplify or the kinds to which they belong.
     From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: It might be said that types are sets, of which tokens are the members. The question of 'general properties' raises the question of whether universals must exist to make kinds possible.