Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Quaestiones de anima' and 'Entity and Identity'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

---

3 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta

16980	We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: There is a good case for a conservative reform of the word 'object'. Objects in the 'logical' sense would be all predicate-worthy identifiabilia whatever. Objects in the 'ontological' sense would form one ontological category among many others.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I n4)
	A reaction: This ambiguity has caused me no end of confusion (and irritation!). I wish philosophers wouldn't hijack perfectly good English words and give them weird meanings. Nice to have a distinguished fellow like Strawson make this suggestion.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier

16766	One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: One thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually existing things only if there is something uniting and tying them to each other. If Socrates were animal and rational by different forms, then to be united they would need something to make them one.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de anima [1269], 11c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.2
	A reaction: This is the reply to the idea that a single thing is just an interesting of many sortal essences. It presumes, of course, that a thing like a horse has something called 'unity'.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

16979	It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: For no object is there a unique character or relation by which it must be identified if it is to be identified at all. This is why it makes no sense to ask, impersonally and in general, of some individual object what makes it the individual object it is.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I)
	A reaction: He links this remark with the claim that there is no individual essence, but he seems to view an individual essence as indispensable to recognition or individuation of the object, which I don't see. Recognise it first, work out its essence later.